Analysis of contracting processes and organizational culture at Naval Air Systems Command by Kovack, Christopher T.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection
2008
Analysis of contracting processes and
organizational culture at Naval Air
Systems Command
Kovack, Christopher T.







Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited. 
 







Analysis of Contracting Processes and Organizational 
Culture at Naval Air Systems Command 
10 June 2008 
by 
Christopher T. Kovack, LCDR, USN 
Advisors: Dr. Rene G. Rendon, Senior Lecturer, 
Jeffrey R. Cuskey, Lecturer, and 
Dr. Susan P. Hocevar, Associate Professor 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
















The research presented in this report was supported by the Acquisition Chair of the 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
 
To request Defense Acquisition Research or to become a research sponsor, 
please contact: 
 
NPS Acquisition Research Program 
Attn: James B. Greene, RADM, USN, (Ret)  
Acquisition Chair 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Road, Room 332 
Monterey, CA 93943-5103 
Tel: (831) 656-2092 
Fax: (831) 656-2253 
e-mail: jbgreene@nps.edu   
 







do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - i - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Abstract 
This study assesses contracting process capabilities at Naval Air Systems 
Command (NAVAIR) in Patuxent River, Maryland, using the Contract Management 
Maturity Model (CMMM). The primary purpose of this study is to analyze NAVAIR’s 
contracting processes to identify key process area strengths and weaknesses and to 
provide a roadmap for improvement. This study also focuses on assessing 
organizational culture at the NAVAIR Contracting Directorate. Several studies have 
shown that organizational factors, such as organizational culture, are strong 
determinants of performance. Other studies have shown that when an organization 
is dominated by a culture type, the most effective leaders are those that demonstrate 
a matching leadership style. This study uses the Organizational Culture Assessment 
Instrument (OCAI) to identify the organization’s current and preferred culture type as 
viewed by the leadership at the organization. The results will provide the NAVAIR 
leaders an awareness of culture type so they can match their leadership style to the 
assessed culture for optimum performance. 
Keywords: Contracting, Contracting Processes, Contract Management 
Maturity Model, CMMM, Organizational Culture, Competing Values Framework, 
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Executive Summary 
At the close of the Cold War, the Department of Defense (DoD) began a 
series of initiatives aimed at downsizing US military forces. The resulting reforms 
slashed the acquisition and contracting workforce in half, but the size and complexity 
of contract actions and obligations nearly doubled over the same period. This 
created a capabilities gap and staffing imbalance which has had serious 
repercussions on the acquisition and contracting capabilities of the DoD.  
This thesis presents a method of assessing contracting processes to 
determine baseline contracting capabilities, process strengths and weaknesses, and 
to provide a roadmap for process improvement. The study was conducted at the 
Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, Maryland, and used the Contract 
Management Maturity Model (CMMM) as a contract management process-
assessment tool. A focused evaluation of the organizational culture at the Naval Air 
Systems Command Contracting Directorate (NAVAIR 2.0) was also completed using 
the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI). The organizational 
culture assessment focused on identifying the culture type and strength of the 
organization as viewed by the Department Heads, Deputy Department Heads, and 
Division Officers. The goal of the culture assessment was to create awareness of the 
organization’s culture type and to match leadership styles for optimal organizational 
performance. 
Data for both assessments were obtained from five NAVAIR 2.0 departments 
and evaluated at both the departmental level and Enterprise level. At the Enterprise 
level, the contract management maturity assessment resulted in a “structured” 
maturity level for the key process areas of Procurement Planning, Solicitation 
Planning, Solicitation, Source Selection, and Contract Administration. The key 
process area of Contract Closeout was rated as having a maturity level of “basic.” 
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culture with a Hierarchy-type culture dominance, while the preferred culture type is 










At the close of the Cold War in 1991, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
began a series of initiatives and reforms to downsize US military forces. The fall of 
the Soviet Union eliminated all substantial military peers; thus, it was theorized that 
the size of the military could be reduced, and defense spending could be reallocated 
to other neglected or under-funded programs. With no military superpowers 
challenging US primacy, it was anticipated that the need for technologically and 
numerically superior weapon systems would decrease. Inherent in this supposition 
was a decrease in military acquisition programs and a reduction of the acquisition 
workforce—including members of the contracting and program management 
workforce. Between 1989 and 2000, the acquisition workforce underwent a series of 
workforce reductions that ultimately slashed the workforce in half. Since 2000, the 
size of the acquisition workforce has remained relatively constant, but the size and 
complexity of contract actions and obligations has increased by 89% (GAO, 2006). 
These reductions had serious implications on the acquisition capabilities of the DoD. 
Primarily, the reduction in workforce created staffing imbalances. DoD organizations 
found they have inadequate resources and staffing to meet workload requirements. 
They are also faced with the potential loss of highly specialized knowledge due to 
the impending retirement of many acquisition specialists over the next several years. 
This contract management paradox and the ensuing acquisition workforce 
knowledge gap has been the source of political debate, GAO reports, and public 
scrutiny. Additionally, the reduction of the acquisition workforce prompted the notion 
that contracting and program management are not critical functions and should not 
be considered a core competency. This perception has encouraged managers to 
shift scarce resources to contract processes perceived as more critical (including 
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while taking resources away from processes perceived to be relatively unimportant, 
such as contract closeout. 
In a resource-limited environment, DoD managers are left with two options to 
overcome budgetary and workforce deficiencies: 1) to request additional funding 
and/or manpower resources, or 2) to find ways to improve process efficiency and 
effectiveness without sacrificing quality. The former is not a feasible solution, as any 
flex in discretionary funds is being used to support the Global War on Terrorism and 
the war in Iraq. This leaves organizations, particularly those whose primary mission 
is to support the weapon systems acquisition function, to seek methods that change 
and improve internal processes.  
The research presented in this study employs an assessment method that 
DoD organizations may apply to their contracting processes to determine their 
programs’ current level of process maturity and to provide a roadmap for 
improvement. This research applied the Contract Management Maturity Assessment 
Tool (CMMAT)—the survey element of the Contract Management Maturity Model 
(CMMM)—to the contract management processes at the Naval Air Systems 
Command (NAVAIR).  
Additionally, for lasting process change to occur, an organization must revise 
its values and goals and adjust its organizational culture to support these changes. 
Leaders must first measure and understand the organization’s culture. Using this 
information, they can lead the change effort and take actions to help the effort 
succeed. This research uses a fundamental, yet highly functional, assessment tool—
the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI)—to evaluate the current 
and future state of organizational culture at the NAVAIR Contracting Directorate. The 
research identifies the culture type and strength of the organization and then makes 
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Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), located in Patuxent River, MD, is the 
Navy’s premier organization for developing, testing, fielding, and supporting naval 
airborne weapons systems. NAVAIR 2.0, the Contracting Directorate,1 is charged 
with administering billions of dollars in contracts annually for the organization. Its 
goal is to deliver effective solutions to the Naval Aviation Enterprise at optimal costs; 
however, the decreasing acquisition workforce and the increasing complexity and 
size of government contracts have made this goal difficult to achieve. 
B. Purpose 
The primary purpose of this study is to analyze NAVAIR’s contracting 
processes across five departments to identify process consistencies and strengths 
and to recommend areas for improvement by applying the Contract Management 
Maturity Model (CMMM). The results of the assessment provide the level of maturity 
of six steps in the contracting process: procurement planning, solicitation planning, 
solicitation, source selection, contract administration and contract closeout. A 
supplemental assessment evaluating NAVAIR’s organizational culture was also 
administered. The Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) and the 
Competing Values Framework (CVF) was used to assess the type and strength of 
NAVAIR Contracting Directorate’s organizational culture. The results were analyzed 
to help foster cultural change resulting from the implementation of several ongoing 
process improvement initiatives and insights gained from this study. The results can 
be used to help NAVAIR leaders improve their leadership skills for optimal 
organizational performance by matching leadership style with the dominant culture 
type.  
This study is not intended to unilaterally and unequivocally change the 
contract management or organizational culture at NAVAIR. Instead, it is designed to 
explain and demonstrate valuable tools that can be used to assist managers in 
                                            
1 NAVAIR 2.0, Contracting Directorate, and Enterprise are used interchangeably throughout this 
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initiating and facilitating sustained process change. These tools provide data that 
can guide focused efforts within the NAVAIR Contracting Directorate to address 
strengths, weaknesses and areas for improvements. This study attempts to identify 
challenges to NAVAIR’s contracting processes and obstacles to the effective 
achievement of contracting efforts and offers recommendations to overcome these 
issues. 
C. Research Questions 
The key element to improving contract management processes is an 
understanding of the organization’s current capabilities. Before implementing 
process change, an organization should embark on a series of assessment efforts 
aimed at identifying the baseline maturity of current contracting processes. While the 
desired end-state is obviously the highest achievable level of process maturity, the 
goal of the assessment is to ascertain the extent of real and/or perceived gaps to 
achieve such an end-state.  
1. Primary Research Question 
a. What level of maturity are the contracting processes at the NAVAIR 
Contracting Directorate? 
2. Supplementary Research Questions 
a. How can the results of the study be used for process improvement at 
NAVAIR’s Contracting Directorate? 
b. What are the dominant culture types and strengths of NAVAIR‘s 
Contracting Directorate? 
c. Can the leaders at NAVAIR’s Contracting Directorate improve or 
maintain organizational performance by understanding its dominant 
culture type? 
D. Benefits and Limitations 
In a resource-scarce environment, DoD organizations must seek process 
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This research provides a baseline for contract management process improvement. It 
determines the level of process maturity for each of six process steps and provides 
the capability to complete future assessments to determine process change 
progress. It also identifies process strengths and weaknesses within each 
department. These data can enable the exchange of best practices that may, in turn, 
afford overall organizational synergistic improvement. 
The organizational culture assessment provides an intuitively appealing and 
easily interpretable way to characterize the organization’s culture or guide a culture 
change process (Cameron & Quinn, 2006).  The OCAI identifies fundamental 
dimensions of organizational culture, creating a foundation for organizational 
discussion that can foster change and improvement. The OCAI is practical, time 
efficient, manageable and involving (Cameron & Quinn, 2006). It is practical 
because it captures key dimensions of culture that have been found to make a 
difference in an organization’s success. The assessment is time efficient because a 
team within the organization can feasibly complete the process of diagnosing and 
creating a strategy for change in a reasonable amount of time. Lastly, it allows for 
involvement because the model facilitates interaction and discussion from every 
member of the organization—but most importantly from those who have a 
responsibility to establish direction and guide fundamental change. The assessment 
has the potential to uncover aspects of the organization’s culture that might 
otherwise not be identified or articulated by organizational members. It helps an 
organization identify where it is now and where it wants to be in the future. Without 
an initial cultural diagnosis, “organizational resistance emanating from an 
entrenched, but outdated culture would have subverted any efforts to implement 
sustaining process changes” (Cameron & Quinn, 2006, p. 87). 
This study can also benefit the leaders at NAVAIR. The results of the OCAI 
will provide a baseline of the organization’s culture that establishes the starting point 
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alignment of leadership style and organizational culture to achieve optimal 
performance. 
Finally, the research will provide a deeper understanding of the contracting 
process and organizational culture to the leaders at NAVAIR. This will contribute to 
that leadership’s greater awareness of the organization’s capabilities and will 
facilitate aligning leadership skills with culture type to improve performance. This 
thesis will contribute to the existing body of knowledge on the subject of 
organizational culture and contracting process assessment. The results will also 
contribute to the database of best practices. Other organizations, especially other 
Systems Commands, can use this thesis as a basis of comparison against their own 
contracting process. 
The primary limitation of this research lies in the fact that the CMMM does not 
identify particular problematic elements within each key process area or provide 
explicit solutions to the problems identified in the assessment results. Instead, it 
provides an assessment of contracting process capability for the purpose of 
identifying weak processes or problem areas. This makes it difficult for the 
researcher to generate specific recommendations or identify particular types of 
training or policy that can improve contracting processes.  
The limitations of the OCAI are similar to those of the CMMM. The OCAI 
provides a foundation, not a comprehensive strategy, for cultural change. First, the 
results of the OCAI only identify an organization’s culture type and strength; they do 
not provide explicit details for improvement or change. Further analysis must be 
conducted to determine the key areas in which training or additional policies and 
standards could be employed to improve organizational capabilities. Second, the 
limited sample size of the organizational culture research does not permit the use of 
statistical analysis to conduct comparisons among multiple cultures. Lastly, for 
process or organizational culture change to occur, the organizational leadership 
must review the results of this research and make a concerted effort to implement 
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E. Scope and Organization 
The study centers on contracting process maturity and elements of 
organizational culture. The general focus identifies the maturity level of NAVAIR’s 
contracting processes and provides the organization with a roadmap for process 
improvement. Using survey assessments, the researcher investigates six contract 
management processes. The causality for the level of process maturity is not 
included in the scope of this study. 
This study is arranged in five chapters. Chapter I defines general information, 
including the thesis research purpose, scope and organization, the primary and 
subsidiary research questions, the benefits and limitations of the research, and the 
methodology for data collection and analysis. 
Chapter II, the Literature Review, provides a summary of the challenges 
facing the DoD acquisition workforce, a historical perspective on the origins, 
variations, and uses of maturity models, background information on the CMMM, the 
importance of organizational culture and culture change, and information on the 
Competing Values Framework (CVF) and OCAI. 
Chapter III provides an overview of Department of Defense (DoD) and 
Department of the Navy (DON) acquisition organizations and contract management 
processes. It also provides background information on the Naval Air Systems 
Command (NAVAIR) organizational structure. Lastly, the chapter describes the 
methodology used to select questionnaire participants at the NAVAIR Contracting 
Directorate. 
Chapter IV presents the data collected via the Contract Management Maturity 
Assessment Tool, which is included as Appendix A, and the Organizational Culture 
Assessment Instrument as revealed in Appendix B. It also discusses 
recommendations for process improvement and methods for matching leadership 
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Chapter V summarizes the research conducted in this study, answers the 
primary and secondary research questions, provides a statement of conclusion, and 
discusses recommended areas for further research. 
F. Methodology 
This study assesses the process capabilities and competencies of Naval Air 
Systems Command (NAVAIR) using a cross-sectional survey covering key 
contracting processes and procedures at a specific point in time (Garrett & Rendon, 
2005). A standardized 60-question survey entitled the Contract Management 
Maturity Assessment Tool (CMMAT) was used to assess contract management 
process maturity. The study does not use descriptive statistics to explain process 
maturity. Rather, qualitative data gathered through a purposive survey is analyzed to 
assess the organization’s contract management maturity level in order to identify 
process consistencies and strengths and to recommend areas for improvement.  
Additionally, a six-section OCAI survey derived from the CVF was used to 
identify culture type and strength at the Contracting Directorate. This portion of the 
study provides both an assessment of the culture at the individual departmental level 
and a holistic view of organizational culture at the NAVAIR Contracting Directorate. 
The results are analyzed for opportunities of leadership development and 
organizational improvement. 
G. Summary 
This chapter discusses background information on the current contracting 
environment, purpose of the study, research questions, scope and organization, and 
research methodology. The next chapter provides a summary of the challenges 
facing the DoD acquisition workforce and provides a historical perspective on the 
origins, variations, and uses of maturity models. Additionally, it discusses the 
importance of organizational culture and culture change and provides a detailed 
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II.  Literature Review 
A.    Introduction  
This literature review is presented in seven sections. The first discusses how 
recent reforms have negatively impacted the federal acquisition workforce. The 
second section focuses on contract management process weaknesses. The third 
discusses the benefits derived through assessment. The fourth section reviews the 
origins and variations of maturity models and their role in process improvement. The 
fifth section provides a synopsis of the Contract Management Maturity Model 
(CMMM) and an example of its implementation. The sixth section is devoted to the 
importance of organizational culture and how it relates to organizational change and 
cultural change. The final section describes the Competing Values Framework 
(CVF) as a tool to measure organizational culture. 
B. Federal Acquisition Workforce 
The Department of Defense is the largest buyer in the world (Humily, Taylor & 
Roller, 1999). It spent over $450 billion in fiscal year 2005 buying items that ranged 
from complex weapon systems, such as the Joint Strike Fighter, to rubber stamps 
and pencils (Bush, 2006). Despite efforts to streamline and improve federal 
acquisition processes, failures of federal contract management have become the 
focus of congressional debate, GAO reports, and public scrutiny. Inefficient and 
ineffective contracting processes undermine the public’s confidence and waste 
taxpayers’ dollars. These include cost overruns, schedule delays, late deliveries, 
quality and performance issues, and unethical behavior by top-ranking civilian and 
military members of the acquisition workforce. The growing social security and 
health care budgets have squeezed discretionary spending and the defense budget, 
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A quality workforce is essential if Americans are to have an efficient and 
responsive federal government (GAO, 1994). Technological advances and electronic 
enhancements have sped up the acquisition timeline, forcing contracting processes 
to be better, faster, cheaper, and more responsive. The federal government has also 
increased the size and complexity of its contracting requirements while reducing the 
size of the acquisition workforce. In the absence of available acquisition workforce 
members, organizations must rely on efficient and effective contract management 
processes to compensate for labor and knowledge gaps. As the government 
increasingly outsources requirements, the need for contracting organizations to 
refine and improve contracting processes becomes more crucial. 
The acquisition workforce’s workload and complexity of responsibilities has 
increased, while the size, skills and knowledge of the workforce has decreased 
(Figure 1). This incongruent combination has lead to inefficiency, mismanagement, 
and susceptibility to fraud, waste, and abuse. The GAO added contract management 
to its High-risk List in 1992 after identifying contract management as a high-risk and 
vulnerable area for the DoD and other federal agencies (GAO, 2007b). 
The importance of the federal acquisition workforce was realized in the early 
1990s with the implementation of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement 
Act (10 USC 1701). This act stemmed from criticisms of the weapon system 
acquisition process. It sought to improve the acquisition process and to more 
effectively manage DoD resources by professionalizing the DoD’s acquisition 
workforce. Specifically, the Act called for formalized training, education, and 
qualification requirements for acquisition workforce members (GAO, 1995). 
The GAO first addressed the problems facing the acquisition workforce in a 
November 1995 report to the House of Representatives Chairman, Committee on 
the Budget. The report identified a disparity between the total obligation authority of 
the DoD and the decreasing size of the acquisition workforce. The report concluded 
that a commensurate increase in workforce would provide opportunities to improve 
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reductions continued, as the fiscal year 1996 Defense Authorization Act required the 
DoD to plan for a 25% reduction and restructure of its acquisition workforce by the 
year 2000 in order to reduce redundancies, maximize opportunities to consolidate, 
and streamline the acquisition process (GAO, 1997). Workforce reductions and their 
interconnection to the need for better acquisition outcomes continued to be 
examined throughout the 1990s until the present. The GAO has issued numerous 
reports addressing acquisition workforce issues that must be corrected in order to 
produce better outcomes, including the “looming human capital crisis” (GAO, 2000; 
GAO, 2002; GAO 2007a), the impending knowledge gap (GAO, 2000), the 
imbalance of skills and experience in the acquisition workforce (GAO, 2000; GAO, 
2002; GAO, 2007a), the transformation of federal acquisition training and recruiting 
programs (GAO, 2002; GAO, 2007a), inefficient contractor oversight (GAO, 2007a), 
and the use of employee incentive programs to attract and retain new recruits (GAO, 
2002). Each GAO report outlines actions required to reshape the acquisition 
workforce (GAO, 2002). And, as mentioned above, driven by the challenges of 
facing the acquisition workforce, strategic human capital management was placed 
on the GAO High-risk List in 2001 (GAO, 2007b).  Figure 1 provides another 
perspective illustrating this concern in that over time the workforce has remained 
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Figure 1.   DoD Contract Obligations and Acquisition Workforce Size (TY$)  
(GAO, 2006) 
C.  Contract Management Process Weaknesses 
The federal acquisition and contracting environment has changed over the 
last several decades in at least three significant areas. First, the contracting 
environment has become increasingly complex. Contract requirements are larger, 
involve more people, cross multiple service boundaries, and must meet continuously 
compressed schedules and costs, as well as the demands of the warfighter. Second, 
the approach to performing contract management has changed, primarily due to 
technological innovation and automation of the process. The Internet has placed 
demands on the acquisition community to compress the acquisition cycle to provide 
a faster, better, and cheaper product or service. Third, the government, and 
particularly the Department of Defense, has implemented multiple efficiency 
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the time to contract award and placed additional pressures on acquisition 
professionals and contracting officers. 
The GAO identified contract management process weaknesses across a 
broad spectrum of contractual business arrangements (GAO, 2007b). For example, 
the GAO found that the DoD frequently initiated work on Iraq reconstruction efforts 
before requirements were defined or understood, resulting in increased costs, 
schedule delays, and reduced scopes of work (GAO, 2007b). Additionally, when 
requirements were not clear, the DoD often entered into arrangements that allowed 
contractors to begin work, but imposed additional risks on the DoD. For example, 
DoD contracting officials were less likely to remove costs questioned by auditors 
from a contractor’s proposal when the contractor had already incurred the costs 
(GAO, 2007b).  
In response to contract management difficulties plaguing federal agencies, 
Rep. Henry Waxman of California introduced the Accountability in Contracting Act 
(HR 1362) in March 2007. His bill called for changes in federal acquisition law 
requiring agencies to limit the use of abuse-prone contracts, increase transparency 
and accountability in federal contracting, and protect the integrity of the acquisition 
workforce. Additionally, the bill called on the Office of Federal Procurement Policy to 
study the size and skill of the federal acquisition workforce and to extend the 
Acquisition Training Fund. 
A proficient contracting department is essential if an organization is to 
exercise the required amount of control and active management of the contracting 
process. Contracting process capability is a key factor for organizational success. 
This is an area in which frequent breakdowns negatively impact the overall contract 
management process. According to the GAO, the DoD should strengthen its 
contracting management structure for services and business processes to promote 
the use of best practices—such as centralizing key functions, conducting analyses of 
expenditures, using commodity teams, achieving strategic orientation, reducing 
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D.  Benefits Derived through Assessment 
Successful organizations must continuously seek process improvement to 
gain a competitive advantage. They must seek to learn what causes events to 
happen in a process and use this knowledge to reduce variation, remove activities 
that contribute no value to the product or service produced, and improve overall 
organizational value (Bauer, Duffy & Westcott, 2002, p. 67). Standardized process 
improvement methodologies provide organizations insight into how well they perform 
critical process functions. Wysocki (2004) developed the Process Improvement 
Lifecycle Model that provides a guide for organizational process improvement 
(Figure 2). It requires the organization to evaluate where it is, where it wants to go, 
how it plans on getting there, and ultimately, how well it did to get there (Wysocki, 
2004). The model establishes a baseline for comparison, develops the goal of the 
specific process improvement, defines a path to the end result, and provides a 
comparison of results against the goal. The process improvement lifecycle is 
endless and will continuously repeat itself (Wysocki, 2004) while increasing process 
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Figure 2.   Process Improvement Lifecycle Model  
(Wysocki, 2004) 
The GAO advocates the use of best practices as a way to improve the federal 
acquisition process by adopting more strategic, results-oriented, and ethical 
business processes and capabilities (GAO, 2006). The federal government has had 
success using the private sector’s approach to contracting and best practices. 
Generally, the results of process maturity assessments allow organizations to 
identify best practices and use them to improve overall process capability.  
The Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM) assessment results 
indicate the maturity level for each key process area and provide a blueprint for 
required training and education to improve process capabilities (Garrett & Rendon, 
2005). Additionally, the assessment results provide information that can guide the 
transfer of best practices from highly mature program offices to those with lower 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 16 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
processes of the whole organization to achieve efficient and effective contracting 
results. 
The OCAI assessment results provide three measurable qualities of 
organizational culture: 1) culture type, 2) culture strength, and 3) culture congruence. 
These three characteristics have been correlated to the successful implementation 
of process change within organizations (Kotter & Heskett, 1992; Cameron & Quinn, 
2006). 
E.  Origins and Variations of Maturity Models 
Process improvement is a well-understood and generally accepted means of 
achieving quality and productivity gains in industries such as software development, 
engineering and program management (Ahern, Clouse & Turner, 2001). Capability 
maturity models offer organizations a place to start the improvement process, help in 
identifying process weaknesses, and provide the opportunity for process 
improvement. They are designed to assess an organization’s processes and apply a 
technical approach to process improvement to help mature management processes. 
Model-based process improvement involves the use of a model to help guide 
the improvement of an organization’s processes (Ahern et al., 2001). Process 
improvement is aimed at increasing the process capability (or the ability of a process 
to produce planned results) of an organization’s work processes. As process 
capability improves, the predictability and consistent measurability of the process 
improves, resulting in an increase in productivity and quality (Ahern et al., 2001). 
This process capability improvement is referred to as process “maturity.” Models 
provide a common set of key process requirements and practice areas to guide 
priorities. They also establish a baseline for process improvement and a measurable 
position from which to assess progress. The goal is for an organization to achieve 
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Numerous capability maturity models have been developed over the last 
several decades, including the Systems Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SE-
CMM), Project Management Maturity Model (PMMM), Software Engineering 
Institutes Capability Maturity Model Integration (SEI-CMMI), and Earned Value 
Management Maturity Model (EVM3). All of these models are the offspring of the 
original CMM (also known as the Software Capability Maturity Model or SW-CMM) 
developed in the mid-80s by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie 
Mellon (Ahern et al., 2001). The fully developed CMM model, released in 1993, was 
designed to assist organizations in improving their software processes. It has been 
adopted by numerous software development organizations worldwide. CMM was 
retired and replaced by SEI-CMMI in August 2000 (Ahern et al., 2001). 
SEI-CMMI provides guidance for efficient and effective process improvement 
across multiple process disciplines in an organization (Ahern et al., 2001). It can be 
applied at varying levels throughout the organization or at the overall enterprise 
level. As stated by the SEI team, CMMI integrates traditionally separate 
organizational functions, sets process-improvement goals and priorities, provides 
guidance for quality processes, and provides a point of reference for appraising 
current processes (SEI, 2007). The CMMI, along with its CMM predecessor, are the 
epitome of staged models. Both models consist of five hierarchical levels of maturity 
ranging from the lowest level, “initial,” to the highest level, “optimizing.” Key process 
areas are measured within each stage to identify the maturity level of each key 
process. The CMMI has four categories (including process management, project 
management, engineering, and support) containing a total of 24 process areas 
(Ahern et al., 2001). Additionally, each process area contains key practice activities 
that are critical to process success. CMMI enables organizations to link all activities 
to their business objectives, implement robust and highly mature practices, and 
address process functions critical to their success (SEI, 2007). The CMMI model has 
been adopted by numerous civilian organizations and government agencies 
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The Systems Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SE-CMM) was also 
developed by Carnegie Mellon’s SEI team for organizations performing significant 
systems engineering activities. It describes the essential elements of an 
organization’s system engineering process that must exist to ensure satisfactory 
systems engineering outcomes and provides a reference of comparison with actual 
system engineering practices. The SE-CMM contains six levels of maturity for 18 
key process areas, beginning with “not performed” and ending with “continuously 
improving” (Ahern et al., 2001). 
There are several variants of program management- and project 
management-specific maturity models developed independently by groups in the 
US, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The most notable is the Project Management 
Maturity Model (PMMM) developed by Dr. Harold Kerzner. Kerzner, a professor of 
Systems Management at Baldwin-Wallace College in Ohio and the president of a 
project management consulting firm, developed an evaluation tool for helping assess 
the progress of integrating project management throughout an organization 
(Kerzner, 2001). The PMMM consists of five maturity levels, ranging from the lowest 
level (called “common language”) to the highest level (called “continuous 
improvement”) (Kerzner, 2001). This tool, much like the other models, can be 
customized to suit individual organizations.  
The variant of the project management-based maturity model created by PM 
Solutions uses a more conventional scale to depict program management maturity 
levels. PM Solutions created a model that is patterned after the SEI CMM and 
references the Project Manager Institute’s A Guide to the Project Management Body 
of Knowledge (PMBOK). It has five levels of maturity representing discrete 
organizational capabilities and examines nine project management knowledge areas 
identified in the PMBOK (Crawford, 2006). The least mature level is “initial process” 
and continues to the final stage called “optimizing process.” This model also 
identifies three special interest areas key to the adoption of project management 
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PM policy and planning efforts. It is the focal point of consistent processes and is 
critical to the organization’s focus on a common vision. The second special interest 
area is management oversight. Management’s interest in a project is critical to 
performance and ultimate success. Lastly, professional development—or the 
development of the technical and leadership skills of project managers—is critical if 
PMs are to maintain proficiency in a changing profession (Crawford, 2006). 
The Earned Value Management Maturity Model (EVM3) developed by Ray 
Stratton (2006) provides the necessary tools to assess the strength of an EVM 
program and to make it more efficient to achieve program success. It provides the 
framework to separate questionable earned value implementations from robust and 
continuously improving implementations. This model is similar to other staged 
models, as it provides five levels of maturity—beginning with “initial” and ending with 
“optimizing implementation” (Stratton, 2006). 
A common characteristic of all maturity models is their use of staged maturity 
levels. Each maturity level has a set of process areas that indicate where an 
organization should focus its efforts to engage in continuous process improvement. 
Each process area is described in terms of key practice activities that contribute to 
satisfying the process goal. As illustrated in Figure 3, the maturity levels, their 
process areas and practice activities represent the recommended path for process 
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Figure 3.   General Structure of Capability Maturity Models  
(Curtis, Hefley & Miller, 2001) 
An organization achieves a maturity level when it has successfully 
implemented all applicable process areas at and below that level (SEI, 2007). The 
maturity levels of capability maturity models typically progress as illustrated in Figure 
4 and with the following common characteristics: 
Level 1: No consistent or repeatable processes 
Level 2: Some process capabilities, but not consistently applied 
Level 3: Defined and integrated processes that are consistently applied 
Level 4: Mature processes applied on all projects, with function being 
recognized as a formal management discipline 
Level 5: Fully mature organization with processes consistently applied 
throughout the organization as part of the overall management 
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Figure 4.   Staged Levels of Process Maturity  
(Ahern et al., 2001) 
Another common feature of maturity models is that they all provide a 
foundation for continual process capability improvement. Assessments using 
maturity models indicate process strengths and best practices that can be applied to 
other departments or program offices within an organization (Garrett & Rendon, 
2005). Maturity assessment methods establish a baseline of process maturity, 
identify improvement targets, and continuously assess improvement progress (SEI, 
2007). Lastly, all capability maturity models can be adjusted to the needs of the 
organization. Models may be used to assess different-sized departments within an 
organization and can be applied to a division just as easily as to the entire 
organization. 
F. Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM) 
Background Information 
The Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM) developed by Rendon 
adopts the framework and technique originally established in the SEI CMM and 
applies it to contract management processes (Rendon, 2003). The purpose of the 
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improve the capability maturity levels of its contract management processes (Garrett 
& Rendon, 2005). This research uses the CMMM and Contract Management 
Maturity Assessment Tool (CMMAT) to evaluate the maturity of contract 
management processes at Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). The model may 
be applied to both buyer and seller processes, but due to the mission and function of 
NAVAIR, this study uses only the CMMAT Buyer’s Questionnaire (Appendix A). 
The framework of the CMMM is similar to previously discussed capability 
maturity models. It consists of a staged maturity-level framework, with descriptions 
of continuous process improvement required to move to the next maturity level. A 
level of maturity is assessed for each of six key process areas involved with 
contracting for supplies or services. Garrett & Rendon (2005) describe the six key 
process areas as follows: 
1. Procurement Planning: The process of identifying which business needs 
can be best met by procuring products or services outside the organization. 
This process involves determining whether to procure, how to procure, 
what to procure, and when to procure. 
2. Solicitation Planning: The process of preparing the documents needed to 
support the solicitation. This process involves documenting program 
requirements and identifying potential sources. 
3. Solicitation: The process of obtaining information (bids and proposals) 
from prospective sellers on how project needs can be met. 
4. Source Selection: The process of receiving bids or proposals and 
applying evaluation criteria to select a provider. 
5. Contract Administration: The process of ensuring that each party’s 
performance meets contractual requirements. 
6. Contract Closeout: The process of verifying that all administrative matters 
are concluded on a contract that is otherwise physically complete. This 
involves completing and settling the contract, including resolving any open 
items. 
The maturity levels used to rank the key process areas of the CMMM range 
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“optimized”) (Figure 5). The six key process areas are supported by key practice 
activities within each process. The practice activities represent the best practices 
and tools that leading organizations use in their contract management process 
(Garrett & Rendon, 2005). These key practice activities form the basis of each 
ranked statement in the CMMAT survey. The maturity levels and their process areas 
represent the recommended path for process improvement. The goal is for an 
organization to achieve the highest levels of maturity in all six contracting process 
areas. Incongruence in one process area can affect the process capability of other 
areas, ultimately leading to overall inefficient and ineffective contracting functions.  
Level 1—Ad Hoc 
• The organization acknowledges that contract management processes exist, that these 
processes are accepted and practiced throughout various industries, and the 
organization’s management understands the benefit and value of using contract 
management processes. 
• Although there are not any organization-wide, established, basic contract management 
processes, some established contract management processes exist and are used within 
the organization, but applied only on an ad-hoc and sporadic basis to various contracts. 
• Informal documentation of contract management processes may exist within the 
organization, but are used only on an ad-hoc and sporadic basis on various contracts.  
• Organizational managers and contract management personnel are not held accountable 
for adhering to, or complying with, any contract management process or standards. 
Level 2—Basic 
• Some basic contract management processes and standards have been established 
within the organization, but are required only on selected complex, critical, or high-
visibility contracts—such as contracts meeting certain dollar thresholds, or contracts with 
certain customers. 
• Some formal documentation has been developed for these established contract 
management processes and standards. 
• The organization does not consider these contract management processes or standards 
established or institutionalized throughout the entire organization. 
• There is no organizational policy requiring the consistent use of these contract 
management processes and standards other than on the required contracts. 
Level 3—Structured 
• Contract management processes and standards are fully established, institutionalized, 
and mandated throughout the entire organization. 
• Formal documentation has been developed for these contract management processes 
and standards, and some processes may even be automated. 
• Since these contract management processes are mandated, the organization allows the 
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each contract, such as contracting strategy, contract type, terms and conditions, dollar 
value, and type of requirement (product or service). 
• Senior management is involved in providing guidance, direction, and even approval of 
key contracting strategy, decisions, related contract terms and conditions, and contract 
management documents. 
Level 4—Integrated 
• The procurement project’s end-user customer is an integral member of the procurement 
team. 
• Basic contract management processes are integrated with other organizational core 
processes, such as cost control, schedule management, performance management, and 
systems engineering. 
• Management uses efficiency and effectiveness metrics to make procurement-related 
decisions. 
• Management understands its role in the procurement management process and executes 
the process well. 
Level 5—Optimized 
• Contract management processes are evaluated periodically using efficiency and 
effectiveness metrics. 
• Continuous process improvement efforts are implemented to improve the contract 
management process. 
• Lessons learned and best-practice programs are implemented to improve the contract 
management processes, standards, and documentation. 
• Procurement process streamlining initiatives are implemented as part of the process 
improvement program. 
Figure 5.   Narrative of CMMM Levels of Maturity  
(Garrett & Rendon, 2005) 
The CMMAT consists of separate surveys for both buyers and sellers. Each 
survey contains 60 standard and specifically developed questions pertaining to each 
key process area. There are a total of 10 questions per process area, each of which 
addresses a process’s key practice activity. The CMMAT employs a 5-point Likert 
scale to score the participant’s responses. The participant’s possible responses and 
associated scores include: “Don’t Know” (0), “Never” (1), “Seldom” (2), “Sometimes” 
(3), “Usually” (4), and “Always” (5). The responses are summed for each process 
area and divided by the total number of survey participants to determine the average 
score. The average is compared against a conversion table (Table 1) to determine 
the maturity level the organization or program management office has achieved for 
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Table 1.   Maturity Score Conversion Table  
(Garrett & Rendon, 2005) 
1. Procurement Planning 
 0—20     Ad hoc 
 21—30   Basic 
 31—40   Structured 
 41—45   Integrated 
 46—50   Optimized 
4. Source Selection 
 0—20     Ad hoc 
 21—30   Basic 
 31—40   Structured 
 41—45   Integrated 
 46—50   Optimized 
2. Solicitation Planning 
 0—20     Ad hoc 
 21—30   Basic 
 31—40   Structured 
 41—45   Integrated 
 46—50   Optimized 
5. Contract Administration 
 0—20     Ad hoc 
 21—30   Basic 
 31—40   Structured 
 41—45   Integrated 
 46—50   Optimized 
3. Solicitation 
 0—20     Ad hoc 
 21—30   Basic 
 31—40   Structured 
 41—45   Integrated 
 46—50   Optimized 
6. Contract Closeout 
 0—20     Ad hoc 
 21—30   Basic 
 31—40   Structured 
 41—45   Integrated 
 46—50   Optimized 
 
If multiple program management offices are evaluated, the process capability 
of the entire organization or enterprise will be that of the lowest maturity level 
achieved for each process area. The organization cannot perform beyond the 
weakest maturity level of one of its program offices. 
The CMMAT uses a cross-sectional survey based on a purposive sample 
(Patton, 2001) to collect data at one point in time (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). The 
results of the survey are not focused on a quantitative statistical interpretation of the 
data. Instead, qualitative analyses of the participant’s answers are conducted to 
explore and describe the organization’s process capability. Thus, a large sample of 
participants is not required. Garrett and Rendon (2005) recommend that study 
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Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Level II Contracting certificate. 
Both their appointment as warranted contracting officers and their DAWIA 
certification confirm that participants have a demonstrated level of education, 
experience, and competence in contract management. These criteria are critical in a 
small, purposive survey because they minimize bias and data outliers and optimize 
the small amount of collected data. 
The model has been introduced to a variety of commercial organizations, 
including Boeing, Goodyear, Raytheon, and General Dynamics, but only Goodyear 
has confirmed its application to commercial contract management processes. 
Independent studies using the CMMM have been conducted at federal agencies—
including the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) (Garrett & 
Rendon, 2005); Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) (Ludwig & 
Moore, 2006); Air Force Material Command’s (AFMC) Air Logistics Center (ALC) at 
Tinker AFB, OK (Nordin & Burton, 2007); and Air Force Material Command’s 
(AFMC) Ogden Air Logistics Center (OO-ALC) at Hill AFB, UT (Sheehan, Moats & 
VanAssche, 2007). The model is most aptly suited for organizations with large 
contracting departments that are broken into multiple contracting divisions or 
program management offices. Application of the CMMM to multiple program 
management offices provides a baseline maturity of contract management 
processes throughout the organization. The results provide managers insight into 
which contracting process areas require improvement in each particular program 
management office. The model also fosters the transfer of best practices from high-
maturity-level programs to programs with lower process maturity (Garrett & Rendon, 
2005). 
In 2003, the model was applied at the SMC as the initial case study for 
Rendon’s research (Rendon, 2003). The SMC, located in Los Angeles, CA, was 
chosen as the case study because it is a large contracting command with multiple 
program management offices, each having independent contracting departments. 
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obtain a baseline level of maturity for each program’s contract management 
processes. The programs included Space-based Radar (SBR), Space Tracking and 
Surveillance Systems (STSS), Space-based Infrared Systems (SBIRS), Evolved 
Expandable Launch Vehicle (EELV), NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS), 
Launch Program (LP), and Defense Support Program (DSP). Figure 6 illustrates the 
results of the SMC assessment. 
 
Figure 6.   CMMM Assessment from SMC Case Study  
(Garrett & Rendon, 2005) 
The assessment concluded that the majority of process areas for each 
program office at the SMC were at the “structured” and “integrated” maturity levels. 
However, the most notable exception was in Contract Closeout, which had the 
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“basic” level, while one program had achieved an “optimized” maturity level. The 
SMC can use the results of the assessment to improve its overall contracting 
process capability, as the analysis provides a “roadmap” of improvement (Garrett & 
Rendon, 2005). It will help implement improvements in all key process areas to 
assist them in progressing to the next maturity level. For example, the SMC can 
leverage the best practices of DSP regarding contract closeout and share them with 
other program offices—such as SBR, GPS, and SBIRS—that scored lower in this 
process area. 
G.  Importance of Organizational Culture 
The cultural dimension is central to all aspects of organizational life 
(Alvesson, 2002). Recent studies have shown a positive correlation between a 
strong organizational culture and organizational performance. Yet, even when 
executives and managers have an awareness of its importance, there is rarely a 
deep understanding of how culture is shaped and how people’s actions are a 
function of culture (Alvesson, 2002).  
A strong organizational culture can be a primary generator of real motivation 
and commitment. In a strong and cohesive culture, the organization’s core values 
are both intensely held and widely shared (Robbins, 1996, p. 685). This high 
intensity of common beliefs makes it easier to draw consensus among employees, 
to build a focus on important goals and objectives, to reduce potential conflicts, to 
cultivate a learning environment, and to lower staff turnover (Robbins, 1996, p. 686). 
Employees no longer need to be compelled to work hard but do so willingly. They 
identify themselves with their organization, just as they do with their families and 
communities.  
The study of organizational culture has intensified over the last several 
decades. Most of the work has been focused on methods of defining organizational 
culture and measuring the interaction of cultures and results (Schein, 1999; Calori & 
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Organizational culture is an extremely broad subject with a variety of definitions and 
theories. Edgar Schein, a renowned and respected expert on the subject, defined 
organizational culture as: 
a pattern of basic assumptions—invented, discovered, or developed by a 
given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and 
internal integration—that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, 
therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, 
and feel in relation to those problems. (2004, p. 17)   
In short, it is the fundamental set of values, beliefs, and norms that guide the 
behavior an organization’s members (Kotter, 1996). 
For Schein, top management members are the most influential members in 
the creation and transmission of culture (Schein, 1988). Schein’s research indicates 
that culture is initially formed primarily by leaders until it is codified. Once culture is 
codified, it remains unchanged (Schein, 1999). He also developed a well-established 
framework describing the dimensions of organizational culture (Schein, 1999). 
Schein’s research on organizational culture reveals that cultures exist on three levels 
(in decreasing order of visibility)—basic assumptions, values, and artifacts (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7.   Schein’s Three-level Model  
(Schein, 2004) 
Basic assumptions are the unconscious assumptions that members of an 
organization have regarding their culture. There are statements of belief, 
unconscious perceptions, and thoughts and feelings that are taken for granted as 
being organizationally acceptable (Schein, 1999). Basic assumptions tend to be 
"invisible," and hence, extremely difficult to change and relearn (Schein, 1999). The 
next level is the organization’s espoused values and norms. These usually exist in 
written form. The last level, called “artifacts,” consists of what members of an 
organization see, feel, and hear. These have to do with visible structures, processes, 
and social organizations that range from office technology to employee dress 
(Schein, 1999). 
The existence of a strong, appropriate organizational culture supports an 
organization’s competitive strategy (Chin-Loy, 2003) by increasing the organization’s 
ability to perform effectively, to operate in dynamic environments, and to survive 
constant change. Additionally, the failures of process implementation and change 
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understand the interdependency of organizational performance, organizational 
change and organizational culture (Schein, 1999). There are a variety of other ways 
to conceptualize organizational culture change. This study uses the Competing 
Values Framework (CVF) because it is a validated model that is well suited to 
analyze the culture changes that may result from NAVAIR’s implementation of 
process-efficiency programs such as AIRSpeed.2 
1.  Organizational Change 
Organizations face a dynamic environment in today’s business world. 
Changes require swift adaptation to reduce cost, improve product or service quality, 
increase productivity and efficiency, maintain competitive advantages, and identify 
new business opportunities (Kotter, 1996). The forces for change can be economic 
shocks, global competition, social trends, world politics, technological innovation, or 
the nature of the workforce (Robbins, 1996). Change also faces several barriers, 
including ingrained habits, economic factors, fear of the unknown, security, and 
selective information processing (Robbins, 1996). 
Kurt Lewin provided an introduction to change theory in the mid-1900s. Lewin 
developed the force field analysis to examine the driving and resisting forces of 
organizational change (Figure 8). The underlying principle of this model is that 
driving factors must outweigh resisting forces in any situation if change is to occur 
(Chin-Loy, 2004). 
                                            
2 AIRSpeed is a Naval aviation initiative to increase productivity and efficiency through the application 
of several continuous process improvement (CPI) methodologies. The three primary methodologies 
are Lean, Six Sigma, and Theory of Constraints. The goal is to harvest efficiencies resulting in faster 
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Figure 8.   Lewin’s Force Field Model  
(Lewin, 1951) 
Lewin also developed a three-step model for implementing change. This 
model describes the cycle of actions an organization must take as it progresses 
through the change process. The first step requires “unfreezing” the organization’s 
current static state by identifying the driving and resisting forces and by defining the 
desired end-state. It thaws forces that maintain the status quo and attempts to instill 
the belief that change is needed (Chin-Loy, 2004). The second step “moves” the 
organization through the change process. The organization identifies, plans, and 
implements appropriate change strategies. In order for movement to occur, the 
driving forces must outweigh the restraining forces (Lewin, 1951). Finally, the third 
step “refreezes” the change at a desired and stable point. The change is stabilized, 
so it becomes integrated into the status quo (Chin-Loy, 2004). Lewin’s three-step 
process is based on the premise that all organizations possess an inherent tendency 
to adjust themselves back to their original position after change has been 
implemented (Cameron & Green, 2004). To counteract this tendency, the 
organization must intentionally move forward and “refreeze” the organization at the 
intended and desired position.   
Kotter’s (1996) eight steps to transforming an organization go beyond Lewin’s 
model of how change progresses by addressing the principles that make change 
happen. Kotter’s research examined the characteristics of 100 companies 
undergoing change and identified eight critical steps of successful change 
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1. Create a sense of urgency. 
2. Form a team of key stakeholders who support the initiative. 
3. Form a vision. 
4. Communicate the vision. 
5. Identify barriers and remove obstacles. 
6. Plan for and create short-term wins. 
7. Consolidate improvements and produce more change. 
8. Anchor the changes in organizational culture. 
Kotter’s model relies heavily on management’s involvement, a solid 
leadership foundation, and organizational communication (Kotter, 1996). 
Nadler and Tushman’s (1980) congruence model takes a different approach 
to analyzing the factors affecting the organizational change process. It differs from 
Lewin’s and Kotter’s models in that it uses an open systems approach that infers 
dependence on the environment in which the organization exists (Falleta, 2005). The 
model’s major premise is that for organizations to be effective, their subparts or 
components must be consistently structured and managed; they must approach a 
state of congruence (Nadler & Tushman, 1980). Their open systems model (Figure 
9) specifies critical inputs, major outputs, and the transformation processes that 
characterize organizational functioning; it then emphasizes the interdependence of 
these organizational components (Nadler & Tushman, 1980). This interdependence 
is the critical aspect on which organizational change relies. Different elements of the 
total system must be aligned in order for the whole system to achieve effective 
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Figure 9.   Congruence Model  
(Nadler & Tushman, 1980) 
Although Lewin’s and Kotter’s models are simple and pragmatic, they provide 
insight into the factors affecting organizational change. Nadler and Tushman’s 
congruence model is a bit more comprehensive: specifying inputs, throughputs, and 
outputs. Specifically, it identifies the interdependencies of organizational 
components (tasks, informal organization, individuals, and formal organizational 
arrangements) and their effect on the transformation process. Each model presents 
two clear characteristics of organizational culture change: 1) that culture change is 
an ongoing process, and 2) that it is very difficult to identify when a successful 
culture change is completed. Organizations should only involve themselves in 
culture change if the current culture does not adequately support the current 
strategic objectives (Cameron & Green, 2004). People need to be convinced by a 
compelling vision rather than be compelled in a coercive way (Cameron & Green, 
2004). The more people are drawn toward the vision, the better. 
2.  Culture Change 
An organization’s culture can affect how it reacts to change. Culture can 
either encourage quick and decisive change when conditions demand, or it can act 
as an impediment, slowing the organization’s change momentum (Clampitt, 2001). 
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because culture is rooted in the collective history of an organization, and so much of 
it is below the surface of awareness (SOI, 2005). A strong organizational culture can 
be detrimental to the change process since it creates resistance to new and different 
ways of completing tasks or processes (Clampitt, 2001). Resistance to change at 
one level of an organization has implications on all other levels. This provides for 
inefficient processes and potential failure.  
A primary focus of Schein’s research was to help organizations effectively 
and efficiently manage culture change to keep up with the dynamic business 
environment (Schein, 1988). Schein (1999) describes six ways in which culture 
evolves: 
1. A general evolution naturally adapting to environment. 
2. A specific evolution of teams or subgroups within an organization 
adapting to their different environments. 
3. A guided evolution resulting from cultural “insights” on the part of 
leaders. 
4. A guided evolution through encouraging teams to learn from each 
other. 
5. A planned and managed culture change through steering committees 
and project-oriented tasks. 
6. A partial or total cultural destruction through new leadership that 
eliminated the carriers of the former culture (turnarounds, 
bankruptcies). 
Schein amplifies the fact that cultural change must not be an organization’s 
sole objective. The objective must be and remain the business goal or process 
(Schein, 1999). Additionally, the former culture should not be viewed as bad, but 
rather a resource from which an organization can draw strength and knowledge. It 
should act as the baseline with its strengths, not weaknesses, being used to act as 
the foundation for the new culture (Schein, 1999). 
Kotter and Heskett (1992) believe that the adaptability of an organization’s 
culture is more important than the overall strength or weakness of the culture. They 
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determining the success of organizational culture change. The process of culture 
change is not very different from any other form of organizational change. Leaders 
must identify core values and beliefs, both conscious and unconscious, 
acknowledge and discuss differences between these core values and beliefs, decide 
upon those to which the organization wishes to commit, establish new norms that 
clearly demonstrate desired values, and continue to repeat these steps (Kotter & 
Heskett, 1992). 
The three most common organizational initiatives implemented in the last two 
decades are quality management initiatives, downsizing initiatives, and re-
engineering initiatives (Cameron & Quinn, 2006). Organizations that have 
implemented quality initiatives to increase efficiency and effectiveness have fallen 
short of their intended change (Cameron & Quinn, 2006). Cameron and Quinn cite 
empirical evidence suggesting that quality initiatives implemented independent of 
culture change are usually unsuccessful. Conversely, when the culture is an “explicit 
target of change” so the initiative is “embedded in an overall culture change effort,” 
organizations are more prone to experience success (Cameron & Quinn, 2006, p. 
11). This is due to short-circuiting an organization’s desire to return to its cultural 
status quo after the organizational improvement has been implemented (Chin-Loy, 
2004). If culture is embedded in the procedure or strategy change, the organization 
is more likely to resist returning to its previous culture. 
Cameron and Green (2004, p. 223) have identified several key themes of 
achieving successful cultural change from their research and experience. Broadly, 
their themes are similar to tenets proposed by other scholars such as Schein and 
Kotter, and they include items such as “always link to organizational vision, mission, 
and objectives,” “create a sense of urgency,” “continually reinforce the need to 
change,” “build on the old and step into the new,” and “create a community of 
focused and flexible leaders.” These themes are intended as guidelines to help 
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3.  Leadership and Culture 
Recent studies have shown a correlation between organizational culture and 
organizational performance. Researchers theorize that organizational performance 
can be enhanced if leadership assesses and understands organizational culture and 
leadership styles. Organization culture has the potential to improve performance of 
an organization when three elements work together. These elements are: (1) a 
strong culture, (2) alignment with the strategies of the firm, and (3) adaptiveness 
(Kotter & Heskett, 1992). Management leadership—especially top management—is 
probably the most critical element in a major organizational change effort (Clement, 
1994, p. 35).  
The leadership role cannot be delegated. The leader must be the change 
agent leading the organizational change. Therefore, a leader objectively determining 
organizational culture derives several benefits. First, a leader can improve or 
maintain high organizational productivity by understanding and assuring a strong 
organizational culture (Cannaday, 1997) through matching leadership styles. 
Second, a leader who understands the link between leadership and organizational 
culture will be better prepared to initiate major changes affecting the organization. 
He/she will be afforded a better understanding of the cultural environment and will 
foster lasting change—rather than short-lived change that ultimately returns to the 
status quo. Finally, establishing a firm grasp on the organization’s culture allows a 
leader to “roadmap” appropriate steps to successful accomplishment of 
organizational goals. 
H.  Competing Values Framework Background 
The Competing Values Framework (CVF) was originally developed by Quinn 
and Rohrbaugh (1983) to measure and compare one culture to another as indicators 
of organizational effectiveness and future success (Cameron & Quinn, 2006). The 
CVF model, as developed in Cameron and Quinn’s book, Diagnosing and Changing 
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Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) to diagnose an organization’s 
culture. They modified the OCAI to use only six of the standard 24 key dimensions 
assessed in the longer version. The six dimensions assessed in this study include: 
1) dominant characteristics, 2) organizational leadership, 3) management of 
employees, 4) organization glue, 5) strategic emphases, and 6) criteria of success. 
These six dimensions were chosen because they had been found to be equally 
predictive of an organization’s culture as the longer original version (Cameron & 
Quinn, 2006).  
The assessment instrument consists of six key dimensions, each with four 
alternatives (Appendix B). There are no right or wrong answers (Cameron & Quinn, 
2006); every organization’s culture is different. The results provide a view of the 
fundamental assumptions on which a company operates. The participants divide 100 
points between each of the four alternatives for each key dimension based upon the 
alternative’s similarity to their organization. The higher the number of points 
assigned, the more similar the alternative is to the organization. The assessment 
instrument is divided into two columns entitled “now” and “preferred.” The “now” 
column indicates the current state of the organization, while the “preferred” column is 
how the participants believe the organization should be in five years to be 
successful. The participants complete the assessment by first assigning points to all 
key dimensions in the “now” column. They then return to the beginning of the 
assessment and assign points to all key dimensions in the “preferred” column. This 
produces two independent ratings of an organization’s culture—one identifies how 
the organization currently exists, and one identifies how it should exist in five years 
(Cameron & Quinn, 2006). 
The scoring of the OCAI is accomplished by averaging the sum of all the 
points allocated to the “A” alternative of each key dimension. This process is 
repeated for the responses in all four alternatives—respectively labeled “A,” “B,” “C,” 
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The scores for each alternative relate to a type of organizational culture. The final 
results are plotted on a radar-type graph for a visual depiction.  
The CVF model illustrates the values of organizational cultures along two 
axes, with each axis having opposite characteristics (Figure 10). The horizontal axis 
differentiates organizational effectiveness criteria that emphasize an internal versus 
an external orientation (Cameron & Quinn, 2006). The vertical axis differentiates the 
organizational effectiveness criteria that emphasize flexibility versus control. These 
two axes form four quadrants, each representing a different type of culture: Clan, 
Adhocracy, Market, and Hierarchy. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Competing Values Framework  
(Cameron & Quinn, 2006) 
As the name of the model implies, each of the four cultures have competing 
values. The “Clan” culture describes an organization in which shared values and 
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involvement programs, and organizational commitment are characteristics of this 
type of culture. Flexibility and internal maintenance are a Clan culture’s focus, with 
success defined in terms of internal climate and concern for people (Cameron & 
Quinn, 2006, p. 43). 
The “Adhocracy” culture is situated in the external focus and flexibility 
quadrant. This culture values adaptability, creativity, flexibility, and individuality. 
According to Cameron and Quinn (2006), power and authority are not centralized in 
this type of culture, but instead transfer from each individual or each team. Leaders 
are considered risk-takers and innovators, with success being measured by the 
ability to innovate and produce new and unique products (Cameron & Quinn, 2006). 
The “Market” culture is focused on external positioning and requires stability 
and control. In this culture competitiveness, goal achievement and productivity are 
core values. It focuses on transactions with external influences—such as customers 
or contractors—to achieve its primary objective of profitability or strength in market 
niche (Cameron & Quinn, 2006). The Market culture is characterized by a tough and 
demanding results-driven workplace in which success is measured by market share 
and penetration (Cameron & Quinn, 2006). 
The “Hierarchical” culture quadrant is bounded by the internal focus and 
control axes. This type of culture values stability, predictability, formality, and 
efficiency. Formal rules, processes, and procedures hold this type of organization 
together and govern the work of its members. Success is measured by low cost, 
smooth operations, and reliability (Cameron & Quinn, 2006).  
Cameron & Quinn (2006) state that the OCAI and CVF have been used 
“thousands” of times to assess organizational culture. A review of research in which 
the CVF was used to diagnose organizational culture indicates a positive 
relationship between organizational culture and effective organizational outcomes 
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characteristics is necessary for organizations to successfully achieve efficiency and 
effectiveness (Chin-Loy, 2004). 
The CVF provides three different measurements regarding an organization’s 
culture: culture type, culture strength, and culture congruence. Indeed, Kotter and 
Heskett’s (1992) research comparing high-performing companies with low-
performing companies found that culture type, culture strength, and culture 
congruence are the distinguishing factors between the two. Research by Cameron 
and Ettington (1988) found that culture type is a stronger determinant of 
organizational effectiveness than culture strength and congruence. Additional 
research by Calori and Sarnin (1991) found that culture types characterized by trust, 
responsibility, quality, and consistency are more likely to produce organizational 
growth. Prior research sufficiently supports the importance of using the CVF to 
analyze the influence of an organization’s culture on its future growth and success. 
The second measurable quality of culture obtained from the CVF is culture 
strength. Using the OCAI, the higher the number of points awarded to a specific 
culture type, the stronger and more dominant it is. While not as strong a predictor as 
culture type, research has linked organizational effectiveness to cultural strength. In 
a study of 13 health care organizations, Paul Nystrom (1993) concluded that 
members of organizations with a strong culture are more committed to the 
organization and perform at higher levels. 
The third measurable quality obtained from the results of the CVF is cultural 
congruence. This metric refers to the extent to which the culture type and strength in 
one component of an organization is similar to the type and strength in other 
organizational components (Cameron & Quinn, 2006). Nystrom (1993) found that 
more congruent cultures indicate consistent organizational strategies, which 
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I.  Summary 
This chapter provided the benefits of using an assessment to evaluate an 
organization’s process capabilities. It developed the history of and provided 
background information on various maturity models that preceded the CMMM. It also 
provided a description of the CMMM and CMMAT. Lastly, it described the 
importance of organizational culture and how culture relates to leadership and 
organizational performance. It also described the CVF and OCAI—the culture 
assessment tools used to measure the type, strength, and congruence of NAVAIR’s 
organizational culture. Chapter III provides information on the Navy acquisition 
organization, DoD contracting process, the choice of NAVAIR for the study, and 
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III. Naval Air Systems Command 
A. Introduction 
 This chapter provides an overview of Department of Defense (DoD) 
and Department of the Navy (DON) acquisition organizations and contract 
management processes. It also provides background information on the Naval Air 
Systems Command (NAVAIR) organizational structure and contract management 
philosophies. Lastly, the chapter describes the methodology used to select 
questionnaire participants at the NAVAIR Contracting Directorate. 
B. Navy Acquisition Organization 
The mission of the US Navy is to “maintain, train and equip combat-ready 
naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom 
of the seas” (US Navy, 2008). An essential part of this mission relies on the Navy’s 
ability to efficiently and effectively contract for services and material that directly or 
indirectly support naval forces. The acquisition of major weapon systems is integral 
to advancing the United States’ Naval warfighting capabilities. However, this 
advancement in warfighting capability is quite costly. The DON spends billions of 
dollars every year on procuring weapons systems. In fiscal year 2007, the Navy 
spent approximately $69 billion to acquire needed goods and services (Bozin, 2006).  
The Navy acquisition executive is the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN(RDA)). The ASN(RDA) sets 
acquisition policy for the DON and manages the Navy’s acquisition system. As 
illustrated in Appendix C, the ASN(RDA) is supported by eleven deputies, six of 
whom are deputy assistant secretaries covering program areas such as ships, 
mine/undersea warfare, air, C4I/EW/Space, Theater Air Defense and Expeditionary 
Forces. The ASN(RDA) deputy assistant secretaries are supported by five functional 
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Acquisition Career Management, Acquisition Reform and Planning, and 
Programming and Resources, along with the Office of Naval Research. Twelve 
Program Executive Offices (PEO), with responsibility for major defense programs in 
areas such as undersea warfare and mine warfare, report directly to the ASN(RDA) 
and are typically located at the Naval Systems Commands (SYSCOM).  
The Navy has eleven major contracting commands that support the 
ASN(RDA) acquisition organization, five of which are considered major systems 
commands or SYSCOMs. These contracting commands are responsible for 
acquiring the goods and services required to support the Department of the Navy 
mission at sea, in the air, or on land. The five major Navy Systems Commands 
(SYSCOMs) include Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), 
Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM), and Naval Supply Systems 
Command (NAVSUP). The SYSCOMs are materiel organizations responsible for the 
development, delivery, and sustainment of weapons systems and materiel under the 
purview of their area of cognizance. The missions of the five Navy SYSCOMs are 
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SYSTEMS COMMAND MISSION PROGRAMS 
Naval Sea Systems 
Command (NAVSEA) 
NAVSEA builds and supports 
America's Fleet of ships and combat 
systems. NAVSEA's team of 
professionals provides virtual 
support anywhere and anytime to 
ensure the Fleet remains ready and 
capable, operating around the 
globe. 
• Ships 
• Shipboard Weapons 
Systems 
• Combat systems 
Naval Air Systems 
Command (NAVAIR) 
NAVAIR provides advanced warfare 
technology to the Navy, Marine 
Corps, and Allied warfighter through 
mastery of six broad categories of 
Naval Aviation technologies: 
Sensors, Aircraft, Weapons, 
Training, Launch & Recovery, and 
Communications. 
• Airframes 
• Aircraft Engines 
• Aircraft electronic 
equipment 
• Air launched weapons 
• Unmanned air systems 
• Avionics 
• Training systems 
Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command 
(SPAWAR) 
SPAWAR's mission is to provide the 
warfighter with knowledge 
superiority by delivering systems of 
command, control, communications, 
computer, intelligence and 
surveillance. By providing effective 
information technology and space 
systems, SPAWAR helps the Navy 
and Defense Department 
communicate and share critical 
information. 
• Space technology 
systems 






• Networks and 
information assurance 
Marine Corps Systems 
Command 
(MARCORSYSCOM) 
MARCORSYSCOM serves as the 
Commandant’s principal agent for 
acquisition and sustainment of 
system and equipment used by the 
Operating Forces to accomplish 
their warfighting mission. 
• Infantry weapons 
systems 
• Communications 
• Armor and fire support 
systems 
• Ground transportation 
• Combat equipment 
Naval Supply Systems 
Command (NAVSUP) 
NAVSUP provides for the material 
support needs of the Navy for 
supplies and supporting services by 
developing and promulgating Navy 
policies and methods for supplying, 
safeguarding, distributing and 
disposing of naval material. 
• Spare parts 
• Industrial Equipment 
• Medical equipment 
• Resale items 
Figure 11.   Naval Systems Command’s Missions and Descriptions  
(DON, 2008) 
C.  DoD Contract Management Process 
As mentioned previously, the Department of Defense is the largest buyer in 
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2005 buying items that ranged from complex weapon systems, such as the Joint 
Strike Fighter, to rubber stamps and pencils (Bush, 2006). Defense spending is 
guided by the Defense Acquisition System (DAS), whose primary objective is to 
acquire quality products that satisfy user needs with measurable improvements to 
mission capability and operational support, in a timely manner, and at a fair and 
reasonable price (DoD, 2003). The defense acquisition process is driven by user 
needs, accessible technology, and available funding. It is a large and complex 
process consisting of milestones, decision points, and phases that must be 
accomplished before a program manager proceeds to the next acquisition phase. 
Often described as being cumbersome and complex (NPR, 1993), a 2004 GAO 
assessment of major weapons systems stated that while the defense acquisition 
system produces superior weaponry, it does so inefficiently and could stand 
significant improvements with respect to the cost and time to deliver the systems to 
US Armed Forces (GAO, 2004). 
A representation of the acquisition process typically portrays defense 
acquisition as a 12-phase process (Lehner, 2001). While this simplistic depiction 
does not truly capture the complexity or bureaucratic nature of the process, the 
pragmatic model characterizes the lifecycle of an acquisition action—beginning with 
user mission analysis and requirements determination and ending with the disposal 
of the acquired item at the end of its useful life.  
The DoD contracting process is an intricate assemblage of actions. Many 
factors—including the complexity of requirements determinations, regulations, 
contract type, cost, and time constraints—dictate the number of steps involved. 
Similar to the overarching acquisition process that controls it, the objective of the 
contracting process is to deliver on a timely basis the best value product or service 
to the customer while maintaining the public's trust by conducting business with 
integrity and fairness and in compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements 
(FAR, 2008, Part 1.102). The six steps (or phases) of DoD contract management as 
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The typical DoD contracting process consists of the following steps or key process 
areas: procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, 
contract administration, and contract closeout. 
Procurement Planning: The objective of the procurement planning phase is 
to determine whether to procure, how to procure, what to procure, how much to 
procure, and when to procure (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). FAR Part 2.101(b)(2) 
defines acquisition or procurement planning as, “the process by which the efforts of 
all personnel responsible for an acquisition are coordinated and integrated through a 
comprehensive plan for fulfilling the agency need in a timely manner and at a 
reasonable cost. It includes developing the overall strategy for managing the 
acquisition” (2008). Procurement planning is a key phase in the contracting process 
because in it, decisions are made that lay the foundation for the entire acquisition. It 
includes activities such as identifying needs and defining requirements, conducting 
market research, committing sufficient funds to acquire the deliverable, and 
developing key documents such as the acquisition or procurement plan, work 
breakdown structure (WBS), and statement of work (SOW). Perhaps, most 
importantly, it is during this phase that the key players in the procurement, including 
the Program Officer, Contracting Officer, and team members, begin developing a 
mutual understanding and cohesive professional partnership that is critical to 
program success. 
Solicitation Planning: Solicitation planning is the process of documenting 
product requirements, identifying potential sources, and preparing the organization 
to solicit products from sellers. It involves preparing the documents needed to 
support the solicitation, documenting program requirements, and identifying potential 
sources (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). Solicitation planning relies on the output of the 
procurement planning phase, as the documents generated in the prior phase will be 
the foundation for the output in this phase. The objective of this phase is to develop 
and issue a solicitation in the form of a Request for Proposal (RFP), Invitation for Bid 
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evaluation criteria that will be used to guide the source selection phase. Activities 
during this phase include selecting the appropriate contract type, determining the 
most appropriate procurement method and basis for contract award, and structuring 
contract terms and conditions (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 
Solicitation: In the solicitation phase, the contracting officer begins to 
execute the procurement plan by obtaining quotations, bids, offers, or proposals 
from prospective offerors/bidders. This phase of the contracting process includes 
such tasks as determining the extent of competition, publicizing the planned 
procurement, preparing and issuing the solicitation, answering inquiries from 
potential offerors/bidders and conducting pre-bid or pre-proposal conferences. The 
solicitation phase may also involve addressing pre-award protests. It is important 
that solicitations are fashioned in a manner that plainly communicates both the 
government’s need and the planned basis of award. It is imperative that the 
government then follow those criteria during the source selection phase.   
Source Selection: In competitive contracting by negotiations, the source 
selection process is a thorough method of evaluating competitive proposals against 
technical, management, financial, schedule, and risk factors. As stated in FAR Part 
15.302, “the objective of the source selection is to select the proposal that 
represents the best value”—including a source that best meets program objectives 
and requirements. Additionally, FAR Part 15.603 (2008) states that source selection 
procedures are designed to: (1) maximize competition; (2) minimize the complexity 
of the solicitation, evaluation, and selection process; (3) ensure the impartial and 
comprehensive evaluation of proposals; and (4) ensure selection of the source 
whose proposal is most advantageous and realistic and whose performance is 
expected to best meet stated government requirements. The award decision is 
based on evaluation factors and significant subfactors that are tailored to the 
acquisition and represent the key areas of importance to support meaningful 
comparison and discrimination between and among competing proposals. Several 
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the government and contractor past performance. The quality of the product or 
service is addressed through consideration of one or more non-cost evaluation 
factors—such as compliance with solicitation requirements, technical excellence, 
management capability, personnel qualifications, and prior experience. The Source 
Selection Authority (SSA) makes the final decision on source selection based on a 
comparative assessment of proposals against solicitation requirements and detailed 
evaluation criteria contained in the Source Selection Plan (SSP). The importance of 
rigorous source selection planning and subsequent source selection cannot be 
overstressed. The decisions made during this contract phase have a significant 
impact on the resulting contract’s cost, schedule, and performance and, ultimately, 
program success or failure.  
Contract Administration: Contract Administration involves those activities 
performed after a contract has been awarded to determine how well the government 
and the contractor met required contract requirements. This part of the procurement 
process facilitates the monitoring and oversight of a contractor’s performance and 
helps ensure that the government receives all contract deliverables. In contract 
administration, the focus is on obtaining supplies and services, of requisite quality, 
on time, and within budget (OFPP, 1994). The specific nature and extent of contract 
administration varies from contract to contract. It can range from the minimum 
acceptance of a delivery and payment to the contractor to extensive involvement by 
program, audit and procurement officials throughout the contract term. Factors 
influencing the degree of contract administration include the nature of the work, the 
type of contract, and the experience and commitment of the personnel involved. 
Contract administration requires clear, unambiguous requirements and 
specifications, and proactive risk mitigation. A good contract administration plan 
identifies potential risk areas and applies appropriate resources to monitor a 
contractor’s performance.  This phase of the contracting process helps ensure that 
products and services are delivered on time and in accordance with contract terms 
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Contract Closeout: Contract closeout begins when the contract has been 
physically completed.  FAR Part 4.804-4 (2008) states that a contract is considered 
to be physically complete when: 1) the contractor has completed the required 
deliveries and the government has inspected and accepted the supplies, 2) the 
contractor has performed all services, and the government has accepted the 
services, and 3) all option provisions, if any, have expired.  Contract closeout is 
complete when all administrative actions have been completed, all disputes settled, 
and final payment has been made. The Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) 
leads the closeout process, coordinates the activities of various stakeholders, and is 
responsible for executing the majority of the closeout actions required by the FAR. 
This phase requires close coordination between the contracting office, the finance 
office, the program office, and the contractor. Depending on the contract type, the 
closeout process can be simple or complex. The FAR also provides a specialized, 
less-restrictive method of closing out contracts commonly called “Quick Closeout 
Procedures.” These procedures are outlined in FAR Part 42.708 and may be used if 
the contract is physically complete and the amount of unsettled indirect costs to be 
allocated to the contract is relatively insignificant. Total unsettled indirect costs are 
considered insignificant if the total to be allocated to any one contract does not 
exceed $1,000,000, and “the cumulative unsettled indirect costs to be allocated to 
one or more contracts in a single fiscal year do not exceed 15 percent of the 
estimated, total unsettled indirect costs allocable to cost-type contracts for that fiscal 
year” (2008, Part 42.708). Quick closeout procedures are especially suitable for low-
risk, low-dollar value contracts.  
D. Naval Air Systems Command Organization 
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) is the principle component of a larger 
organization called the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE). Created in 2004, the NAE 
forms a partnership between multiple organizations within the Naval Aviation 
community to encounter and resolve issues on an enterprise-wide basis rather than 
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optimization of resources, cost savings, increased readiness, and improved material 
management. The NAE is modeled after a corporate structure with a board of 
directors that guides the aviation enterprise and enables communication across 
various enterprise elements. NAE’s vision is to, "Efficiently deliver the right force, 
with the right readiness, at the right time…today, and in the future" (NAE, 2008, p. 
90). The members of the NAE Board of Directors include Commander, Naval Air 
Forces (CNAF), Deputy Commandant, US Marine Corps Aviation (USMC AVN), 
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Commander, Naval Air Forces Reserve 
(CNAFR), Naval Education & Training Command (NETC), Naval Sea Systems 
Command (NAVSEA), Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), Naval 
Inventory Control Point (NAVICP), and Commander, Naval Installations Command 
(CNIC).  
NAVAIR is an integral part of NAE’s ability to develop, deliver, and sustain 
weapon systems and materials required to support the Department of the Navy’s 
mission at sea, in the air, or on land. NAVAIR’s mission is to: 
Provide unique acquisition, research, development, test and evaluation, and 
in-service support capabilities for airborne weapons systems that are 
technologically superior and readily available. Using a full-spectrum 
approach, the Command delivers optimal capability and reliability for the 
Soldier and the Marine. (NAVAIR, 2008) 
NAVAIR is based at Naval Air Station (NAS) Patuxent River, MD, and 
employs approximately 31,600 civilian and military at its eight major sites throughout 
the United States (Peterson, 1999). The command’s primary purpose is to “develop, 
acquire, and support naval aeronautical and related technology systems for the 
Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard” (1999). NAVAIR manages more than 148 
acquisition programs and supports more than 4,000 active aircraft in the Navy and 
Marine Corps inventory (1999). As a Systems Command, NAVAIR reports directly to 
ASN(RDA) and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). NAVAIR is composed of 
several elements working as a fully integrated team. These include other SYSCOMs, 
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Systems Command (SPAWAR), and Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP), as 
well as four Program Executive Offices (PEO). Critical to the NAVAIR mission are 
the four PEOs who are organized to serve as the centralized manager for their 
assigned functions and associated major programs. They are responsible for the 
acquisition and lifecycle management of most of the aircraft and weapons used by 
the Navy and Marine Corps. While the PEOs are part of the NAVAIR organization, 
they report directly to the ASN(RDA) for matters of acquisition. The four PEOs 
aligned with NAVAIR are Tactical Aircraft Programs or PEO(T), Air Anti-submarine 
Warfare (ASW), Assault & Special Mission Programs or PEO(A), Strike Weapons & 
Unmanned Aviation or PEO(W), and Joint Strike Fighter Program or PEO(JSF). The 
basic functions of each PEO are relatively consistent and include the following: 
facilitate work of program teams; provide assessments on program cost, schedule 
and performance to the appropriate Milestone Decision Authority (MDA); provide 
evaluations, options and recommendations on program planning and execution to 
the appropriate MDA and Resource Sponsor; and enable program teams to deliver 
the best, most affordable products to the fleet with manageable risk in cost, schedule 
and performance. Appendix D displays the organizational structure of NAVAIR. 
NAVAIR is a competency-aligned organization (CAO) with seven core 
competencies: Program Management (AIR 1.0), Contracts (AIR 2.0), Research & 
Engineering (AIR 4.0), Test & Evaluation (AIR 5.0), Logistics & Industrial Operations 
(AIR 6.0), Corporate Operations (AIR 7.0), and the Comptroller (AIR 10.0). These 
competencies provide a pool of resources, including people, processes, and tools, 
that enables the formation of cross-functional teams called Integrated Product 
Teams (IPT).  
The Contracting Directorate for the NAVAIR organization is NAVAIR 2.0. It is 
responsible to contract for the supplies, services, and material requirements of 
Integrated Program Teams (IPT), Program Support Teams (PST), and Enterprise 
Teams (ET). As shown in Appendix D, NAVAIR 2.0 has six departments—including 
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programs, and one that develops and maintains contract policy and process 
management for NAVAIR 2.0. Each division supporting a PEO is organized in 
Procurement Contracting Officer (PCO) teams that provide key members to the 
PEOs’ various Integrated Product Teams (IPT) with a standard package of 
contracting support and expertise. Per NAVAIRINST 5400.1C (Naval Air Systems 
Command, 2000), PCO teams provide a standard suite of the following contract 
management expertise: acquisition planning, business strategy development, 
solicitation formulation and generation, business clearances, formulation, generation 
and award of contracts and modifications, cost and price analysis, negotiations, 
source selection, conducting and participating in Contract Review Boards, contract 
administration, reporting, close-out, file maintenance, claim adjudication, disposition 
of defective pricing actions, and participation in litigation activities. 
AIR 2.1: AIR 2.1 is the Contracts Policy and Process Management 
Department whose primary responsibilities are to develop, maintain, support, 
implement and manage contract policy, processes, and resources. AIR 2.1 ensures 
compliance with laws and regulations, responds to inquiries from outside agencies, 
formulates and prepares contract reports for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Congress, and interprets and implements 
OSD and Congressional policy. AIR 2.1 also maintains contract files, prepares and 
distributes contracts, manages the department’s human and financial resources, and 
is responsible for process automation and system administration (Naval Air Systems 
Command, 2000). 
AIR 2.2: AIR 2.2 provides contract management and planning for Naval 
aviation programs assigned to Program Executive Officer for Tactical Aircraft 
Programs (PEO(T)), including major weapons systems for tactical aircraft, air 
assault, special missions, and missiles. This department provides key members for 
PEO(T) IPTs to plan, negotiate, execute, and administer contracts for assigned 
programs. It manages and executes the contracting functions for tactical aircraft 
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over $4.2 billion and completed 1,009 contract actions for programs under its 
purview (NAVAIR, 2007). 
AIR 2.3: AIR 2.3 provides contract management and planning for Naval 
aviation programs assigned to Program Executive Officer for Air ASW, Assault and 
Special Mission Programs (PEO(A)), including major weapons systems for Air Anti-
submarine Warfare (ASW) and rotary wing programs. AIR 2.3 provides key 
members for PEO(A) IPTs to plan, negotiate, execute, and administer contracts for 
assigned programs. It manages and executes the contracting functions for rotary 
wing programs such as the Presidential Helicopter, P-3C, V-22, H-60, and H-53. In 
fiscal year 2007, AIR 2.3 obligated over $6 billion and completed 1,050 contract 
actions for programs under its control (NAVAIR, 2007). 
AIR 2.4: AIR 2.4 provides contract management and planning for Naval 
aviation programs assigned to Program Executive Officer for Strike Weapons and 
Unmanned Aviation (PEO(W)) and NAVAIR 1.0. This department provides key 
members for PEO(W) IPTs to plan, negotiate, execute, and administer contracts for 
assigned programs. In fiscal year 2007, AIR 2.4 obligated over $2.5 billion and 
completed 1,536 contract actions for programs under its control (NAVAIR, 2007). 
This department manages and executes the contracting functions for strike weapons 
programs—including the Advanced Anti-radiation Guided Missile (AARGM), AGM-
154A Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), and Tactical Tomahawk (TacTom)—as well 
as unmanned aviation vehicles—including Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 
(BAMS) UAV, Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(VTUAV), and Navy-unmanned Combat Air System (N-UCAS). 
AIR 2.5: AIR 2.5 is responsible for the management, planning and leadership 
of Aircraft Support Contracts. AIR 2.5 has contracting teams located at Patuxent 
River, MD; Lakehurst, NJ; Orlando, FL; China Lake, CA; and Point Mugu, CA. These 
teams provide contracting expertise in procuring support services, facilities, 
maintenance, training, and hardware for Navy and Marine Corps aircraft. They also 
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aircraft weapons systems development and integration (Naval Air Systems 
Command, 2000). In fiscal year 2007, AIR 2.5 teams obligated over $5.5 billion and 
completed over 18,367 contract actions for programs under their control (NAVAIR, 
2007). 
AIR 2.6: AIR 2.6 provides contract management and planning for naval 
aviation programs assigned to Program Executive Officer for Joint Strike Fighter 
(PEO(JSF)). This department provides key members for PEO(JSF) IPTs to plan, 
negotiate, execute, and administer contracts for assigned programs. AIR 2.6 
manages and executes the contracting functions exclusively for the JSF program. In 
fiscal year 2007, AIR 2.6 obligated over $5.3 billion and completed 141 contract 
actions for programs under its control (NAVAIR, 2007). 
E. Why Select Naval Air Systems Command for this 
Research? 
NAVAIR 2.0’s mission, organizational structure, function, and contracting 
processes present the perfect architecture for applying the CMMM. NAVAIR is the 
Navy’s premier aviation contracting agency, providing vital mission support to the 
Navy and Marine Corps aviation communities. It supports a variety of weapon 
system programs—ranging from tactical and rotary wing aircraft to strike weapons 
and unmanned aviation vehicles to services for aircraft logistics support and 
maintenance. 
NAVAIR’s organizational structure lends well to cross-PEO comparisons of 
contract management processes. Best practices from PEOs with more mature 
contract management processes are able to be distributed to those with less mature 
processes. Since NAVAIR 2.0’s key contracting processes are only as strong as its 
weakest department, sharing best practices creates a synergistic effect that will raise 
the enterprise’s level of process maturity. This type of analysis would not be possible 
with a contracting organization in which all contract management processes are 
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NAVAIR is one of five SYSCOMs and one of eleven major contracting 
commands within the Navy. The NAVAIR Contracting Directorate is responsible for 
the contracting actions across the majority of contract management process phases. 
This fact is critical to this research, as functional responsibility for all process phases 
is required to properly employ the assessment. An organization that only manages 
one or two phases of the contract management process will not gain the full utility of 
the CMMM as a process-assessment tool. 
The Contracting Directorate also has a sufficient number of warranted 
contracting officers with significant contracting experience in each department. This 
provides an adequate pool of participants for this research. A large sample size was 
not a critical aspect of this research, but a larger number of participating PCOs 
contribute to the soundness of the results. When compared to only one or two 
participants, a sample size of three to five PCOs per PEO will have a smaller 
sampling variability and standard error, resulting in a more realistic depiction of 
process maturity. The large numbers of PCOs also provide surety that the research 
would not have to rely on the responses of non-warranted members of the 
command. This helps lend legitimacy to participant responses. 
NAVAIR 2.0 is a mature organization with a large acquisition workforce and 
significant contracting throughput. It has a large number of experienced and 
dedicated civilian PCOs. This is significant because military officers tend to change 
commands every two or three years, which does not allow them to develop the same 
level of process understanding as their civilian counterparts. Civilians, on the other 
hand, are more likely to remain at the organization for a longer period, which allows 
them to have a more comprehensive understanding of contract management 
processes, resulting in more reliable survey answers. NAVAIR 2.0 has a significant 
amount of contracting throughput. In 2007, NAVAIR 2.0 had a total of 22,103 
awarded contract actions and obligated $23.4 billion for over 287 programs 
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Lastly, the CMMM has never been applied to a Navy SYSCOM. The majority 
of research has been conducted at US Air Force Contracting Commands (Garrett & 
Rendon, 2005; Nordin & Burton, 2007; Sheehan, Moats & VanAssche, 2007) or has 
been introduced to commercial companies such as Goodyear, Raytheon, General 
Dynamics and Boeing. This particular organization is well suited for process 
improvement assessments because it exhibits the same workforce problems that 
persist throughout the DoD. As illustrated in Figure 12, the total number of the 
acquisition workforce is decreasing, while the number of obligation actions is 
increasing. From FY01 to FY06, NAVAIR 2.0 saw a 28% increase in obligation 
actions and a 13% reduction in workforce. Given this trend, a contract management 
maturity assessment has the potential to highlight areas for process improvement 
and to facilitate better utilization of scarce resources. As stated by the famous 
military strategist Sun Tzu (1963), “With many calculations one can win; with few 
one cannot. How much less chance of victory has one who makes none at all!”  
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F. Contract Management Maturity Assessment Tool 
(CMMAT) Participant Selection 
The CMMM is specifically designed to focus on an organization’s key contract 
management process areas and activities to provide a baseline level of process 
maturity (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). This is accomplished through the use of a 
process-focused survey given to a select group of participants. The selection of the 
survey participants is a critical component to the validity of the survey results. The 
survey is purposive in nature and uses a qualitative rather than quantitative 
approach to analyze the survey outcome. The results are designed to explore and 
describe the maturity of an organization’s contract management processes. Since 
the results of the survey are not subject to statistical analysis, a small sample of 
specifically designated participants is preferred over of a large random sample. 
However, small sample sizes are more easily influenced by bias and outlier 
responses. To minimize the effects of potential bias and to collect the highest quality 
data possible, the participants must meet specific requirements. The participants 
must be fully qualified, warranted contracting officers, and they must have attained a 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Level II or III certification 
in Contracting. These strict requirements act as both a filter for biased responses 
and a qualifier for professional competence. The desired effect is a higher quality 
response that is more readily evaluated by qualitative analysis. 
Warranted contracting officers are the US Government’s authorized agents 
for soliciting offers, negotiating, awarding, modifying, and terminating contracts. 
They are specially designated individuals with the authority to enter into contracts on 
behalf of the government, represent the government in contractual matters, and 
obligate government funds. The authority of these contracting officers is limited by 
their warrant and the requirements of law, executive orders, and regulations. 
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officer are set by FAR Part 1.603-2 (2008),3 DFARS 201.603 (DoD, 2008),4 and local 
regulation or policy. According to NAVAIR Instruction 4205.2H, prospective 
contracting officers must meet certain education, training, and experience 
requirements before being issued a warrant. They must also “demonstrate, through 
past performance, a high degree of business acumen, sound judgment and solid 
character” (Naval Air Systems Command, 2005). Specifically, in order to serve as a 
contracting officer with authority to award or administer contracts above the 
simplified acquisition threshold, a person must: 
1. Have completed all Defense Acquisition University (DAU) contracting 
courses required for a contracting officer at the grade level in which the 
person is serving. Certification levels and required courses vary based 
on civilian or military grade. 
2. Have at least two years of experience in a contracting position. 
3. Have received a baccalaureate degree from an accredited educational 
institution and completed at least 24 semester credit hours, or 
equivalent, of study from an accredited institution of higher education 
in any of the following disciplines: accounting, business finance, law, 
contracts, purchasing, economics, industrial management, marketing, 
quantitative methods, and organization and management. 
4. Meet such additional requirements, based on the dollar value and 
complexity of the contracts awarded or administered in the position, as 
may be established by the Secretary of Defense. (NAVAIR, 2005) 
                                            
3 FAR Part 1.603-2 states that “in selecting contracting officers, the appointing official shall consider the 
complexity and dollar value of the acquisitions to be assigned and the candidate’s experience, training, 
education, business acumen, judgment, character, and reputation. Examples of selection criteria include: 
(a) Experience in government contracting and administration, commercial purchasing, or related fields;  
(b) Education or special training in business administration, law, accounting, engineering, or related fields;  
(c) Knowledge of acquisition policies and procedures, including this and other applicable regulations;  
(d) Specialized knowledge in the particular assigned field of contracting; and 
(e) Satisfactory completion of acquisition training courses.” 
4 NAVAIRINST 4205.2H, Delegation of Contracting Officer Authority, is modeled after DFARS Part 201.603-2, 
which provides the criteria an individual must meet before being granted the authority to award or administer 
contracts above the simplified acquisition threshold. The four criteria identified in NAVAIRINST 4205.2H are the 
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The second criterion for participant selection is the attainment of a DAWIA 
Level II or III certification in Contracting. The requirements for DAWIA certification 
are similar to those of NAVAIR’s requirement to become a warranted contracting 
officer. The individual must have a baccalaureate degree or at least 24 semester 
hours in a business administration field such as accounting, economics, business 
finance, etc., or at least 10 years of acquisition experience and two years of 
contracting experience. DAWIA certification also requires the completion of several 
DAU contracting training courses and at least two years of contracting experience 
for Level II certification and four years of experience for Level III certification.5 The 
combination of these two requirements make warranted contracting officers optimal 
participants in this study. The warrant and DAWIA certification requirement requires 
candidates to maintain a level of proficiency and competency that ensures the 
survey-taker has significant knowledge of all contracting processes at NAVAIR 
(Garrett & Rendon, 2005).  
The participants represent contracting officers from all departments in the 
NAVAIR Contracting Directorate. As discussed, each department in NAVAIR 2.0 is 
assigned to a Program Executive Office (PEO) and provides support for naval 
aviation programs assigned to that PEO. The exception is AIR 2.5, which provides 
aircraft service support contracts to all PEOs. The survey participants represent the 
following departments and PEOs: AIR 2.2/PEO(T), AIR 2.3/PEO(A), AIR 
2.4/PEO(W), AIR 2.5, and AIR 2.6/PEO(JSF). 
G. Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) 
Participant Selection 
Unlike the strict selection criteria for the CMMAT participants, the framework 
of the OCAI does not require participants to meet any specific prerequisites. The 
                                            
5 The specific DAWIA Contracting education, training, and experience requirements for each 
certification level are outlined in the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) catalog, which is available 
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participants selected for the OCAI were members of middle and upper management, 
including Department Heads, Deputy Department Heads, Division Officers and 
Procurement Contracting Officers. They included mid-grade military officers and 
civilian members of the contracting workforce in leadership positions. This group of 
participants was selected because its members are the conduit linking upper 
management and lower-grade contract specialists. It is also here that culture 
change, if required, must first occur. Upper management must receive middle-level 
management buy-in before significant change is to take place. The participants 
represented civilian and military leaders from all PEOs and departments in the 
NAVAIR Contracting Directorate organization: AIR 2.2/PEO(T), AIR 2.3/PEO(A), AIR 
2.4/PEO(W), AIR 2.5, and AIR 2.6/PEO(JSF). 
H. Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of the contract management process used 
by most DoD contracting agencies. It also discussed why NAVAIR was chosen for 
the study and provided background information on the organizational structure of 
NAVAIR and the functions of each department within NAVAIR’s Contracting 
Directorate, NAVAIR 2.0. Lastly, this chapter discussed how the participants for the 
study were selected and the rationale behind the strict selection criteria. 
The next chapter presents findings and results from data collected via the 
Contract Management Maturity Assessment Tool and the Organizational Culture 
Assessment Instrument. It also discusses recommendations for process 
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IV.  Findings, Results and Recommendations 
A. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the results of the study in the context of the primary 
research question: How mature are NAVAIR’s contract management processes? 
This chapter presents an analysis of the CMMAT and OCAI results, provides a 
description of findings, and discusses recommendations for improvement. The 
results of the CMMAT for each of NAVAIR’s five contracting departments are 
presented individually, followed by an Enterprise assessment of NAVAIR 2.0 as a 
whole. The recommendations for contract management process improvement are 
discussed in the context of the six key process areas of contract management. 
The results of the OCAI for each of the five contracting departments are 
presented individually, followed by an enterprise-wide assessment of organizational 
culture. Additionally, the results are compared to the “average” culture of more than 
3,000 companies assessed by Cameron and Quinn (2006).  
B. Administration of the CMMAT Assessment 
The CMMAT was administered onsite at NAS Patuxent River, MD, for AIR 
2.2, AIR 2.3, AIR 2.4, and AIR 2.5. The CMMAT was made available through an 
online survey website for AIR 2.6 due to its offsite location in Crystal City, VA. 
Completed surveys were accepted from all respondents between the periods of 
March 3, 2008, to April 7, 2008. A total of 21 CMMAT surveys were completed and 
returned, but three surveys were removed from the assessment. Two of the unused 
surveys were completed by non-warranted contracting officers. These were removed 
to maintain the integrity of participant selection and the reliability of the results. As 
stated in Chapter III, only warranted contracting officers with a DAWIA Level II or III 
certification were used in this research. These two requirements, appointment as a 
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qualifiers and confirm the participants’ professionalism, experience, and knowledge 
on the subject of contract management processes. The other CMMAT survey that 
was removed did not complete the demographics profile portion. The researcher 
was not able to determine if the respondent was a warranted contracting officer with 
a DAWIA Level II or III certificate. 
Of the 18 completed surveys, the average minimum years of contracting 
experience for all participants was 12.45 years. NAVAIR 2.0 has 25 Department 
Heads, Deputy Department Heads and Division Officers—giving a response rate of 
72%. All participants were warranted contracting officers and held at least a DAWIA 
Level II certification in Contracting. The range of responses for each department 
varied from two to five. 
C.  Results of the CMMAT Assessment 
This section provides an analysis of the results of the CMMAT assessment for 
each of NAVAIR 2.0’s departments. It also provides an analysis of the contract 
management process maturity of the NAVAIR contracting enterprise by comparing 
all departments to determine the lowest-assessed maturity level for each key 
process area. The listing of the departmental CMMAT scores is provided in Table 7, 
and the maturity level of each contract management key process area for each 
department and the Enterprise is illustrated in Appendix E. This graphical illustration 
of the CMMAT results provides the senior management of NAVAIR 2.0 a “quick-
look” assessment of the contract management process capability for each 
department (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 
1. AIR 2.2/PEO(T) 
AIR 2.2 provided three completed CMMAT surveys (Table 2). The 
participating AIR 2.2 contracting officers averaged a minimum of 12 years 
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Of the 180 questions answered by AIR 2.2 participants, eight responses were 
in the “don’t know” category; zero were in the “never” category; one was in the 
“seldom” category, and 60 were in the “sometimes” category. The remaining 111 
responses were in the “usually” or “always” categories. The key process areas of 
procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, contract administration, and 
contract closeout were rated as “structured,” while source selection was rated as 
“integrated.” AIR 2.2 was the highest-rated department in the contract closeout key 
process area. In fact, it was the only department to achieve a rating above “basic” in 
this process area. 
For AIR 2.2 (based on the CMMAT survey responses)—in the key process 
areas Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, Contract 
Administration, and Contract Closeout—contract management processes are fully 
established, institutionalized, and mandated throughout the department. Since the 
contract management processes are mandated, AIR 2.2 permits the tailoring of 
processes and documents, allowing consideration for the unique aspects of each 
contract, such as contracting strategy, contract type, terms and conditions, dollar 
value, and type of requirement. Formal documentation has been developed for these 
contract management processes and standards, and some processes may even be 
automated. Finally, AIR 2.2 survey responses indicate that senior management is 
involved in providing guidance, direction, and even approval of key contracting 
strategy, decisions, related contract terms and conditions, and contract management 
documents (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 
The key process area of Source Selection was rated as “integrated,” 
indicating that the procurement project’s end-user customer is an integral member of 
the procurement team. Basic Source Selection processes are integrated with other 
departmental core processes such as cost control, schedule management, 
performance management, and systems engineering. AIR 2.2 management uses 
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understands its role in the procurement management process (Garrett & Rendon, 
2005). 












CM201 36 43 43 49 45 43 
CM203 33 33 32 38 39 30 
CM204 36 33 34 39 34 19 
Mean 35 36 36 42 39 31 
Maturity Structured Structured Structured Integrated Structured Structured 
2.  AIR 2.3/PEO(A) 
AIR 2.3 provided five completed CMMAT surveys (Table 3). The participating 
AIR 2.3 contracting officers averaged a minimum of 12.75 years experience, with the 
least experienced participant having a minimum of six years contracting experience. 
Of the 300 questions answered by AIR 2.3 participants, 10 responses were in 
the “don’t know” category; zero were in the “never” category, and 15 were in the 
“seldom” category. The remaining 275 responses are in the “sometimes” category or 
higher. This represents 92% of the total responses and is the highest ratio of 
responses in the top three categories of any department. For this department, based 
on the survey responses, the contract closeout process area received a “basic” 
maturity rating; the solicitation and contract administration process areas received a 
“structured” maturity rating; and procurement planning, solicitation planning, and 
source selection received an “integrated” rating. AIR 2.3 is the only department to 
receive three ratings above the “structured” maturity level. 
For AIR 2.3’s Contract Closeout process, the CMMAT survey responses 
indicated that some basic Contract Closeout processes and standards have been 
established but are only required on complex, critical, or highly visible contracts—
such as contracts meeting certain dollar thresholds or contracts with certain 
customers. Some formal documentation has been developed for these established 
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these processes or standards established or institutionalized throughout the entire 
organization. Finally, there is no organizational policy requiring the consistent use of 
Contract Closeout processes and standards other than on the required contracts 
(Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 
The key process areas Solicitation and Contract Administration were rated as 
“structured”—indicating these contract management processes are fully established, 
institutionalized, and mandated throughout the department. Since the contract 
management processes are mandated, AIR 2.3 allows the tailoring of processes and 
documents, allowing consideration for the unique aspects of each contract—such as 
contracting strategy, contract type, terms and conditions, dollar value, and type of 
requirement. Formal documentation has been developed for these contract 
management processes and standards, and some processes may even be 
automated. Lastly, AIR 2.3 survey responses indicated that senior management is 
involved in providing guidance, direction, and even approval of key contracting 
strategy, decisions, related contract terms and conditions, and contract management 
documents (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 
The key process areas Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, and 
Source Selection were rated as “integrated,” indicating that the procurement 
project’s end-user customer is an integral member of the procurement team. Basic 
contract management processes are integrated with other departmental core 
processes such as cost control, schedule management, performance management, 
and systems engineering. AIR 2.3’s management uses efficiency and effectiveness 
metrics to make procurement-related decisions and understands its role in the 
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CM301 42 42 42 46 41 33 
CM302 38 39 38 42 41 8 
CM303 36 37 34 37 31 23 
CM304 46 43 42 43 41 39 
CM305 46 42 42 45 43 39 
Mean 42 41 40 43 39 28 
Maturity Integrated Integrated Structured Integrated Structured Basic 
 
3. AIR 2.4/PEO(W) 
AIR 2.4 provided four completed CMMAT surveys (Table 4). The participating 
AIR 2.4 contracting officers averaged a minimum of 14 years experience, with the 
least experienced participant having between 11 to 15 years of contracting 
experience. 
Of the 240 survey questions answered by AIR 2.4 participants, nine were in 
the “don’t know” category; three were in the “never” category; 41 were in the 
“seldom” category; 82 were in the “sometimes” category, and 99 were in the 
“usually” category. Only six responses were in the “always” category, which is the 
lowest number of all departments. For AIR 2.4, based on the survey responses, 
contract closeout was the lowest-rated key process area, with a “basic” maturity 
level. All other key processes areas, including procurement planning, solicitation 
planning, solicitation, source selection, and contract administration, were rated as 
“structured.” 
Based on the survey answers, AIR 2.4’s Contract Closeout process maturity 
level was rated as “basic,” indicating that some basic Contract Closeout processes 
and standards have been established but are only required on complex, critical, or 
highly visible contracts—such as contracts meeting certain dollar thresholds or 
contracts with certain customers. Some formal documentation has been developed 
for the Contract Closeout processes and standards, but the department does not 
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the entire organization. Finally, there is no organizational policy requiring the 
consistent use of Contract Closeout processes and standards other than on the 
required contracts (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 
Contract management processes for the key process areas Procurement 
Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, Source Selection, and Contract 
Administration are fully established, institutionalized, and mandated throughout the 
department. Since the contract management processes are mandated, AIR 2.4 
allows the tailoring of processes and documents, allowing consideration for the 
unique aspects of each contract, such as contracting strategy, contract type, terms 
and conditions, dollar value, and type of requirement. Formal documentation has 
been developed for these contract management processes and standards, and 
some processes may even be automated. Lastly, AIR 2.4 survey responses indicate 
that senior management is involved in providing guidance, direction, and even 
approval of key contracting strategy, decisions, related contract terms and 
conditions, and contract management documents (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 












CM401 26 30 30 31 30 22 
CM402 28 35 35 34 28 32 
CM404 34 25 33 33 36 22 
CM405 35 39 35 39 36 29 
Mean 31 32 33 34 33 26 
Maturity Structured Structured Structured Structured Structured Basic 
4. AIR 2.5/Aircraft Support Contracts 
AIR 2.5 provided four completed CMMAT surveys (Table 5). The participating 
AIR 2.5 contracting officers averaged a minimum of eight years experience, with the 
least experienced participant having between two to five years of contracting 
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In the AIR 2.5 Aircraft Support Contracts department, of the 240 questions 
answered, 10 were in the “don’t know” category; zero were in the “never” category, 
and 19 were in the “seldom” category. The remaining 211 questions, representing 
over 87% of the questions answered, were in the “sometimes,” “usually,” or “always” 
categories. Based on the AIR 2.5 survey responses, the lowest key process area 
(contract closeout) was rated as “basic,” while the highest rated key process area 
(source selection) was rated as “integrated.” The remaining key process areas—
including procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, and contract 
administration—were rated as “structured.” 
Based on AIR 2.5’s survey responses, the Contract Closeout process 
maturity level was rated as “basic,” indicating that some basic Contract Closeout 
processes and standards have been established but are only required on complex, 
critical, or highly visible contracts—such as contracts meeting certain dollar 
thresholds or contracts with certain customers. Some formal documentation has 
been developed for the Contract Closeout processes and standards, but the 
department does not consider these processes or standards established or 
institutionalized throughout the entire organization. Finally, there is no organizational 
policy requiring the consistent use of Contract Closeout processes and standards 
other than on the required contracts (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). AIR 2.5’s Contract 
Closeout process was perilously close to being rated as “ad hoc.” This would 
indicate that the organization acknowledges that Contract Closeout processes exist, 
are practiced throughout various industries, and have benefits and values. However, 
the department may not have established any basic Contract Closeout processes; 
or, while some established Contract Closeout processes exist and are used within 
the organization, they are applied on an ad-hoc and sporadic basis to various 
contracts. Informal documentation of the Contract Closeout process may exist, but 
are used only on an ad-hoc and sporadic basis on various contracts. Finally, 
management and contract management personnel are not held accountable for 
adhering to, or complying with, any Contract Closeout process or standard (Garrett 
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The contract management key process areas Procurement Planning, 
Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, and Contract Administration were rated as 
“structured,” indicating that contract management processes are fully established, 
institutionalized, and mandated throughout the department. Since the contract 
management processes are mandated, AIR 2.5 allows the tailoring of processes and 
documents, allowing consideration for the unique aspects of each contract—such as 
contracting strategy, contract type, terms and conditions, dollar value, and type of 
requirement. Formal documentation has been developed for these contract 
management processes and standards, and some processes may even be 
automated. Lastly, AIR 2.5 survey responses indicate that senior management is 
involved in providing guidance, direction, and even approval of key contracting 
strategy, decisions, related contract terms and conditions, and contract management 
documents (Garret & Rendon, 2005). 
The key process area Source Selection was rated as “integrated,” indicating 
that the procurement project’s end-user customer is an integral member of the 
procurement team. Basic contract management processes are integrated with other 
departmental core processes such as cost control, schedule management, 
performance management, and systems engineering. AIR 2.5’s management uses 
efficiency and effectiveness metrics to make procurement-related decisions and 
understands its role in the procurement management process (Garret & Rendon, 
2005). 












CM501 33 35 40 40 34 22 
CM502 39 36 35 39 35 0 
CM503 43 46 47 48 31 29 
CM504 38 36 36 35 34 32 
Total 38 38 40 41 34 21 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 72 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
5. AIR 2.6/PEO(JSF) 
AIR 2.6 provided two completed CMMAT surveys (Table 6). Both participants 
had at least 15 years of contracting experience, making AIR 2.6 the most 
experienced department. 
Of the 120 survey questions answered by the AIR 2.6 participants, three were 
in the “don’t know” category; one was in the “never” category; 14 were in the 
“seldom” category, and 30 were in the “sometimes” category. The remaining 72 
answers were in the “usually” or “always” categories. Based on the AIR 2.6 survey 
responses, contract closeout, rated as “basic,” was the lowest-assessed key process 
area. Procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, and 
contract administration were rated as “structured.” 
For AIR 2.6, based on the survey responses, the Contract Closeout process 
was rated as “basic,” indicating that some basic Contract Closeout processes and 
standards have been established but are only required on complex, critical, or highly 
visible contracts—such as contracts meeting certain dollar thresholds or contracts 
with certain customers. Some formal documentation has been developed for these 
established Contract Closeout processes and standards, but the department does 
not consider these processes or standards established or institutionalized 
throughout the entire organization. Finally, there is no organizational policy requiring 
the consistent use of Contract Closeout processes and standards other than on the 
required contracts (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 
Procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, and 
contract administration were rated as “structured.” This maturity level is 
representative of contract management processes that are fully established, 
institutionalized, and mandated throughout the department. Since the contract 
management processes are mandated, AIR 2.6 allows the tailoring of processes and 
documents, allowing consideration for the unique aspects of each contract, such as 
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requirement. Formal documentation has been developed for these contract 
management processes and standards, and some processes may even be 
automated. Lastly, AIR 2.6’s survey responses indicate that senior management is 
involved in providing guidance, direction, and even approval of key contracting 
strategy, decisions, related contract terms and conditions, and contract management 
documents (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 












CM601 39 39 40 41 39 27 
CM603 32 33 32 32 37 29 
Mean 36 36 36 37 38 28 
Maturity Structured Structured Structured Structured Structured Basic 
 
6. NAVAIR 2.0/Contracting Enterprise 
The Enterprise level, consisting of all departments, provides a top-level 
assessment of the NAVAIR contracting directorate. The Enterprise maturity level is 
established by evaluating the lowest-rated maturity level for each of the six key 
contract management process areas. The reason for using the lowest-rated maturity 
level is that an organization is only as strong as its weakest link (Garrett & Rendon, 
2005). If an Enterprise is to improve overall process capability, it cannot leave 
weaker departments behind. Instead, it must baseline its improvement efforts on the 
capabilities of weaker departments.  
Based on the survey responses for the overall Enterprise, the maturity level of 
the key process areas Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, 
Source Selection, and Contract Administration were determined to be “structured,” 
while the key process area of Contract Closeout was assessed to be at the “basic” 
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At the Enterprise level, contract management processes for the key process 
areas—Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, Source Selection, 
and Contract Administration—are fully established, institutionalized, and mandated 
throughout the department. Since the contract management processes are 
mandated, the Enterprise allows the tailoring of processes and documents, allowing 
consideration for the unique aspects of each contract—such as contracting strategy, 
contract type, terms and conditions, dollar value, and type of requirement. Formal 
documentation has been developed for these contract management processes and 
standards, and some processes may even be automated. Lastly, the entire 
Enterprise survey responses indicate that senior management is involved in 
providing guidance, direction, and even approval of key contracting strategy, 
decisions, related contract terms and conditions, and contract management 
documents (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 
The Enterprise-wide assessment rated the Contract Closeout key process 
area as having a “basic” level of maturity. This maturity rating indicates that some 
basic Contract Closeout processes and standards have been established but are 
only required on complex, critical, or highly visible contracts—such as contracts 
meeting certain dollar thresholds or contracts with certain customers. Some formal 
documentation has been developed for the Contract Closeout processes and 
standards, but the organization does not consider these processes or standards 
established or institutionalized throughout the entire organization. Finally, there is no 
organizational policy requiring the consistent use of Contract Closeout processes 
and standards other than on the required contracts (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 












AIR 2.2 Structured Structured Structured Integrated Structured Structured 
AIR 2.3 Integrated Integrated Structured Integrated Structured Basic 
AIR 2.4 Structured Structured Structured Structured Structured Basic 
AIR 2.5 Structured Structured Structured Integrated Structured Basic 
AIR 2.6 Structured Structured Structured Structured Structured Basic 
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D. Guide for Process Capability Improvement 
This section focuses on the individual key contract management process 
areas for the Enterprise and discusses recommendations for improvement to the 
next level of maturity. It also identifies key process functions with within each phase 
with knowledge-deficient areas that the Enterprise should include in its training plan. 
Finally, this section discusses additional recommendations for process improvement. 
1. Procurement Planning 
Based on the results of the assessment, the Enterprise maturity level of 
Procurement Planning was determined to be “structured.” To progress to the next 
level of maturity, “integrated,” the Enterprise should ensure that the procurement 
project’s end-user customer is an integral member of the procurement team. Basic 
contract management processes should be integrated with other departmental core 
processes such as cost control, schedule management, performance management, 
and systems engineering. Management will need to use efficiency and effectiveness 
metrics to make procurement-related decisions.  Finally, management will need to 
understand its role in the procurement planning process and execute the process 
well (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 
To accomplish this, the Enterprise should utilize the best practices of more 
mature departments and implement their use throughout the organization. A 
database of best practices and lessons learned should be instituted to help the 
Enterprise achieve the ultimate Procurement Planning maturity level of “optimized.” 
Additionally, the Enterprise should incorporate several Procurement Planning-
specific topics into its training program. The training should focus on subjects such 
as determining funds availability, preliminary cost and schedule estimates, 
assessing and managing risk, conducting assessments of market conditions, 
selecting the appropriate contract type, developing contract incentives, and 
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2. Solicitation Planning 
Based on the results of the assessment, the Enterprise maturity level of 
Solicitation Planning was determined to be “structured.” To progress to the next level 
of maturity, “integrated,” the Enterprise should ensure that the procurement project’s 
end-user customer is an integral member of the procurement team. Basic contract 
management processes should be integrated with other departmental core 
processes such as cost control, schedule management, performance management, 
and systems engineering. Management will need to use efficiency and effectiveness 
metrics to make procurement-related decisions.  Finally, management will need to 
understand its role in the procurement planning process and execute the process 
well (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 
To accomplish this, the Enterprise should utilize the best practices of more 
mature departments and implement their use throughout the organization. A 
database of best practices and lessons learned should be instituted to help the 
Enterprise achieve the ultimate Solicitation Planning maturity level of “optimized.” 
The Enterprise should also incorporate several Solicitation Planning-specific topics 
into its training program. The training should focus on subjects such as developing 
solicitations, assessing solicitation documents, and developing appropriate criteria 
for proposal evaluation (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 
3. Solicitation 
Based on the results of the assessment, the Enterprise maturity level of 
Solicitation was determined to be “structured.” To progress to the next level of 
maturity, “integrated,” the Enterprise should ensure that the procurement project’s 
end-user customer is an integral member of the procurement team. Basic contract 
management processes should be integrated with other departmental core 
processes such as cost control, schedule management, performance management, 
and systems engineering. Management will need to use efficiency and effectiveness 
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understand its role in the procurement planning process and execute the process 
well (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 
To accomplish this, the Enterprise should utilize the best practices of more 
mature departments and implement their use throughout the organization. A 
database of best practices and lessons learned should be instituted to help the 
Enterprise achieve the ultimate Solicitation maturity level of “optimized.” Additionally, 
the Enterprise should incorporate several Solicitation-specific topics into its training 
program. The training should focus on subjects such as developing an integrated 
approach to establishing qualified bidders lists, conducting market research, 
advertising procurement opportunities, and conducting pre-proposal conferences 
(Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 
4. Source Selection 
Based on the results of the assessment, the Enterprise maturity level of 
Source Selection was determined to be “structured.” To progress to the next level of 
maturity, “integrated,” the Enterprise should ensure that the procurement project’s 
end-user customer is an integral member of the procurement team. Basic contract 
management processes should be integrated with other departmental core 
processes such as cost control, schedule management, performance management, 
and systems engineering. Management will need to use efficiency and effectiveness 
metrics to make procurement-related decisions. Finally, management will need to 
understand its role in the procurement planning process and execute the process 
well (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 
To accomplish this, the Enterprise should utilize the best practices of more 
mature departments and implement their use throughout the organization. A 
database of best practices and lessons learned should be instituted to help the 
Enterprise achieve the ultimate Source Selection maturity level of “optimized.” The 
Enterprise should also incorporate several Source Selection-specific topics into its 
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and evaluation criteria, evaluation standards, estimating techniques and weighting 
systems, and negotiation techniques, planning, and actions (Garrett & Rendon, 
2005). 
5. Contract Administration 
Based on the results of the assessment, the Enterprise maturity level of 
Contract Administration was determined to be “structured.” To progress to the next 
level of maturity, “integrated,” the Enterprise should ensure that the procurement 
project’s end-user customer is an integral member of the procurement team. Basic 
contract management processes should be integrated with other departmental core 
processes such as cost control, schedule management, performance management, 
and systems engineering. Management will need to use efficiency and effectiveness 
metrics to make procurement-related decisions.  Finally, management will need to 
understand its role in the procurement planning process and execute the process 
well (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 
To accomplish this, the Enterprise should utilize the best practices of more 
mature departments and implement their use throughout the organization. A 
database of best practices and lessons learned should be instituted to help the 
Enterprise achieve the ultimate Contract Administration maturity level of “optimized.” 
The Enterprise should also incorporate several Contract Administration-specific 
topics into its training program. The training should focus on subjects such as 
conducting integrated assessments of contractor performance, such as 
assessments of cost, schedule and performance. Training should also focus on an 
integrated team approach to management contracts. This would include managing 
post-award contract activities—such as modifying contracts, processing contractor 
invoices and payments, managing contractor incentives, resolving disputes, and 
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6. Contract Closeout 
Based on the results of the assessment, the Enterprise maturity level of 
Contract Closeout was determined to be “basic.” To progress to the next level of 
maturity, “structured,” the Enterprise should ensure that contract management 
processes are fully established, institutionalized, and mandated throughout the 
organization. The organization should allow the tailoring of processes and 
documents, allowing consideration for the unique aspects of each contract, such as 
contracting strategy, contract type, terms and conditions, dollar value, and type of 
requirement. Formal documentation should be developed for these contract 
management processes and standards, and some processes should be automated. 
Finally, senior management should be involved in providing guidance, direction, and 
even approval of key contracting strategy, decisions, related contract terms and 
conditions, and contract management documents (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 
To accomplish this, the Enterprise should utilize the best practices of more 
mature departments and implement their use throughout the organization. A 
database of best practices and lessons learned should be instituted to help the 
Enterprise achieve the ultimate Contract Closeout maturity level of “optimized.” 
Additionally, the Enterprise should incorporate several Contract Closeout-specific 
topics into its training program. The training should focus on subjects such as 
contract termination, closeout planning and considerations, and closeout standards 
and documentation (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 
7. Additional Recommendations for Process Improvement 
The primary purpose of the CMMM and this research is to facilitate 
continuous process improvement for the organization’s contract management 
processes (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). The NAVAIR Contracting Directorate must 
seek continuous process improvement, provide a vision for process maturation, and 
implement process-improvement opportunities. This can be accomplished through a 
contract management process-improvement workgroup. The goal of this organic 
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other NAVAIR-wide continuous process-improvement initiatives such as AIRSpeed. 
This would alleviate redundancy while leveraging synergistic benefits of dual 
improvement efforts. The organic workgroup could also seek new ideas for process 
improvement from members of the NAVAIR 2.0 organization and could provide 
focused training in knowledge-deficient areas. 
The Enterprise should also compare the results of this research and process 
maturity with other Naval Systems Commands, such as NAVSEA or SPAWAR. 
Since the goal of their efforts is to benefit the warfighter, the SYSCOMs should 
share contract management best practices and lessons learned. NAVAIR should 
evaluate and implement best practices and conduct a CMMM self-reassessment 
after implementation efforts have taken place and new practices have matured. 
The Enterprise should provide continuous training on the functional 
components of each phase of the contracting process to every member of the 
organization. Several participants provided a majority response of “don’t know” in 
some key process areas—indicating they were knowledge-deficient in these 
contracting process areas. The organization should strive to ensure that every 
member of the contracting workforce is proficient in each phase of the contract 
management process. This creates consistency, which is critically important in the 
current DoD acquisition workforce resource-deficient environment. 
Each department could create an “as is” process map to determine key points 
meaningful to each PEO or program to measure contract process results. In doing 
so, each must optimize its processes to ensure it is performing the correct 
procurement processes. NAVAIR 2.0 could also conduct another CMMM 
assessment in several years. This could be done with an internal self-assessment 
tiger team or by a graduate student at the Naval Postgraduate School. Additionally, 
NAVAIR 2.0 could have an outside agency or civilian firm specializing in contract 
management evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of contract management 
processes and key process and practice areas. These assessments should be 
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Finally, the Contract Closeout process, the least mature phase of the 
enterprise and the majority of individual departments, requires focused 
improvement. This key process area also saw the highest return of “don’t know” 
responses, indicating it requires additional attention. Best practices for improving this 
phase include training on closeout requirements and documentation, a dedicated 
contract closeout team responsible for ensuring contract completion, final payment, 
and administrative closeout, and management involvement in the process. 
E. OCAI Assessment Results 
This section presents the results of the organizational culture assessment in 
the context of the CVF. The OCAI was administered both onsite at NAS Patuxent 
River, MD, and online for all NAVAIR 2.0 departments—including AIR 2.2, AIR, 2.3, 
AIR 2.4, AIR 2.5, and AIR 2.6. Completed surveys were accepted from all 
respondents between the periods of March 3, 2008, to April 7, 2008. Data were 
collected in hardcopy form and through an electronic version sent via e-mail to 
participants. Of the 24 OCAI surveys received, only 22 were usable. The other two 
responses were removed from the assessment because they were incomplete. 
NAVAIR 2.0 has 25 Department Heads, Deputy Department Heads and Division 
Officers—giving an 88% response rate. 
The target respondents were upper- and mid-level managers and supervisors 
at the NAVAIR Contracting Directorate. The assessment was given to Deputy 
Department Heads and Division Officers and included both military and civilian 
personnel. The range of responses per department varied from two to seven. 
Demographics such as age, gender, race, or education level were not collected from 
participants. The purpose of this research is to provide an overall assessment of 
organizational culture type, strength and congruence. The demographic 
discriminators were deemed non-critical to the nature and purpose of this research. 
A summary of the OCAI findings for each contracting department and the 
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1. AIR 2.2 
AIR 2.2 returned four surveys (n=4), whose results reveal a strong dominant 
Hierarchy-type culture. The aggregate scores for each “current” culture type are: 
Clan (21), Adhocracy (16), Market (24), and Hierarchy (39). The aggregate scores 
for each “preferred” culture type are: Clan (25), Adhocracy (14), Market (29), and 
Hierarchy (32). This was the only department that preferred a more Market-type 
culture than their current level of Market culture. As illustrated by the OCAI scores in 
Table 8, a Hierarchy-type culture was also favored as the preferred dominant culture 
type, though the responses show some desired reduction in the preferred Hierarchy 
culture and increases in both Clan- and Market-type cultures. Adhocracy was the 
least significant culture type for both the current and preferred type. 
Table 8.   AIR 2.2 Mean OCAI Scores 
 Clan Adhocracy Market Hierarchy 
Participant Current Preferred Current Preferred Current Preferred Current Preferred
A201 19 18 24 21 36 37 21 25 
A202 26 28 12 5 33 32 29 35 
A203 28 38 22 23 17 31 33 8 
A204 11 17 8 8 10 16 72 60 
Mean 21 25 16 14 24 29 39 32 
2. AIR 2.3 
The seven surveys (n=7) received from AIR 2.3 reveal a current perception of 
a strong Market-dominant culture (Table 9).  The aggregate scores for each “current” 
culture type are: Clan (17), Adhocracy (15), Market (39), and Hierarchy (29). The 
aggregate scores for each “preferred” culture type are: Clan (23), Adhocracy (20), 
Market (30), and Hierarchy (27). A Market-type culture was rated as both the current 
and preferred culture, but was only slightly preferred over a Hierarchy culture. The 
scores for Clan and Adhocracy-type cultures increased as “preferred” culture types, 
while Market-type culture decreased significantly. Adhocracy was both the least 
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Table 9.   AIR 2.3 Mean OCAI Scores 
 Clan Adhocracy Market Hierarchy 
Participant Current Preferred Current Preferred Current Preferred Current Preferred
A301 26 29 25 30 23 18 26 23 
A302 15 28 19 24 43 24 23 24 
A303 18 18 13 23 50 43 19 16 
A304 20 31 12 11 41 33 28 26 
A305 23 29 14 13 28 26 35 33 
A306 4 4 13 15 47 38 37 44 
A307 13 25 8 24 39 27 41 24 
Mean 17 23 15 20 39 30 30 27 
 
3. AIR 2.4 
The five surveys (n=5) received from AIR 2.4 reveal a strong Hierarchy-
dominant culture (Table 10). The aggregate scores for each “current” culture type 
are: Clan (15), Adhocracy (15), Market (28), and Hierarchy (42). Of the five 
departments measured, this was the highest Hierarchy rating and the lowest Clan 
and Adhocracy rating. The aggregate scores for each “preferred” culture type are: 
Clan (25), Adhocracy (20), Market (21), and Hierarchy (34). This department favors 
Hierarchy as the preferred culture type and gave it the highest preferred rating of 
any other department. However, a significant decrease in the “preferred” Hierarchy 
culture score was balanced by a 10-point increase in the Clan score. 
Table 10.   AIR 2.4 Mean OCAI Scores 
 Clan Adhocracy Market Hierarchy 
Participant Current Preferred Current Preferred Current Preferred Current Preferred
A401 10 28 12 23 43 26 35 23 
A402 19 27 23 26 32 26 26 22 
A403 14 16 11 11 18 20 58 53 
A404 14 34 16 30 33 18 37 18 
A405 18 18 12 13 16 15 55 54 
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4. AIR 2.5 
AIR 2.5 returned four OCAI surveys (n=4). The results reveal a mixed 
culture—with relatively equal scores among all culture types, but with a slightly 
higher current rating for Clan-type culture. The aggregate scores for each “current” 
culture type are: Clan (29), Adhocracy (21), Market (25), and Hierarchy (25). Of the 
departments measured, AIR 2.5 had the highest current rating for Clan and the 
lowest rating for Hierarchy. This trend continued for the “preferred” culture, as AIR 
2.5 also had the highest preferred Clan rating and lowest preferred Hierarchy rating 
of any department. The aggregate scores for each “preferred” culture type are: Clan 
(35), Adhocracy (25), Market (21), and Hierarchy (19). AIR 2.5 was the only 
department to indicate that it both currently has and prefers a Clan-type culture 
(Table 11). 
Table 11.   AIR 2.5 Mean OCAI Scores 
 Clan Adhocracy Market Hierarchy 
Participant Current Preferred Current Preferred Current Preferred Current Preferred
A501 24 29 14 27 25 19 37 25 
A502 18 21 25 32 29 30 28 18 
A503 59 65 20 18 13 9 8 8 
A504 15 24 26 24 31 27 28 25 
Mean 29 35 21 25 25 21 25 19 
 
5. AIR 2.6 
The two surveys (n=2) received from AIR 2.6 reveal a current Market-
dominant culture.  The aggregate scores for each “current” culture type are: Clan 
(16), Adhocracy (24), Market (33), and Hierarchy (27). AIR 2.6 had the highest 
Adhocracy ratings for both current and preferred culture. The aggregate scores for 
each “preferred” culture type are: Clan (25), Adhocracy (28), Market (27), and 
Hierarchy (20). This was the only department whose preferred culture type was 
different from the current culture. The favored culture went from Market to a slight 
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preference for a less Hierarchy-type culture in exchange for a Clan-type culture 
(Table 12). 
Table 12.   AIR 2.6 Mean OCAI Scores 
 Clan Adhocracy Market Hierarchy 
Participant Current Preferred Current Preferred Current Preferred Current Preferred
A601 10 25 20 26 33 27 38 23 
A602 23 25 28 31 33 28 16 17 
Mean 16 25 24 28 33 27 27 20 
 
6. NAVAIR 2.0/Contracting Enterprise 
Twenty-two usable surveys (n=22) were received from all departments in the 
Contracting Directorate.  The aggregate scores6 for each “current” culture type are: 
Clan (18), Adhocracy (17), Market (31), and Hierarchy (34). The aggregate scores 
for each “preferred” culture type are: Clan (25), Adhocracy (21), Market (26), and 
Hierarchy (28). A summation of all the culture surveys reveals a current Hierarchy-
dominant culture. The preferred culture is mixed with a slight preference for a 
Hierarchy-type culture.  
Individual departments and the Enterprise culture are compared to the 
average organizational profile as determined by Cameron and Quinn (2006). 
Cameron and Quinn’s average profile represents the survey data of more than 
80,000 managers representing over 3,000 organizations. Cameron and Quinn’s 
average organization scores do not represent the ideal score, as organizational 
effectiveness was not a criterion for inclusion. They contain data from highly 
successful organizations, as well as data from failed organizations. Additionally, the 
organizations in the “average” profile represent a variety of industries—such as 
services, retail, public administration, manufacturing, and construction, to name a 
                                            
6 The aggregate scores of the Enterprise were calculated using the weighted averages of the five 
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few. The average scores are included as the “C&Q Average” in Tables 13 and 14 as 
a basis of comparison, not a goal for emulation. The mean OCAI scores for each 
department are provided in rank order in Table 15 to more readily illustrate 
preference changes between “current” and “preferred” cultures. 
Table 13.   “Current” Mean OCAI Scores by Culture Type 
  Clan Adhocracy Market Hierarchy 
Organization N Mean Mean Mean Mean 
AIR 2.2 4 21 16 24 39 
AIR 2.3 7 17 15 39 30 
AIR 2.4 5 15 15 28 42 
AIR 2.5 2 29 21 25 25 
AIR 2.6 4 16 24 33 27 
      
Enterprise* 22 18 17 31 34 
C&Q Average  21 15 32 24 
* The Enterprise scores are weighted averages of all departments 
 
Table 14.   “Preferred” Mean OCAI Scores by Culture Type 
  Clan Adhocracy Market Hierarchy 
Organization N Mean Mean Mean Mean 
AIR 2.2 4 25 14 29 32 
AIR 2.3 7 23 20 30 27 
AIR 2.4 5 25 20 21 34 
AIR 2.5 2 35 25 21 19 
AIR 2.6 4 25 28 27 20 
      
Enterprise* 22 25 21 26 28 
C&Q Average  21 15 32 24 
* The Enterprise scores are weighted averages of all departments 
Table 15.   Rank Order of Mean OCAI Scores by Culture Type 
  Clan Adhocracy Market Hierarchy 
Organization N Current Preferred Current Preferred Current Preferred Current Preferred
AIR 2.2 4 3 3 4 4 2 2 1 1 
AIR 2.3 7 3 3 4 4 1 1 2 2 
AIR 2.4 5 3 2 4 4 2 3 1 1 
AIR 2.5 2 1 1 4 2 3 3 2 4 
AIR 2.6 4 4 3 3 1 1 2 2 4 
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F.  Discussion of OCAI Results 
There is no one type of culture that predicts successful organizational 
performance or exemplifies the model of a successful company. However, several 
studies have shown that organizational factors, such as organizational culture, are 
strong determinants of performance (Calori & Sarnin, 1991). Conversely, other 
studies have shown that strong cultures have lead to the demise of some 
organizations or even whole industries (Schein, 2004).  Denison and Spreitzer 
(1991) discuss the implications of strong cultures on organizational performance. 
They state that overemphasizing one culture type within an organization may cause 
it to become dysfunctional, and the strengths of that culture become its weaknesses. 
The goal of this study was not to formulate a grand strategy for cultural 
change, as implementing culture change is no easy undertaking. Embarking on such 
a path requires a much larger scope than was available to this researcher and a 
much more in-depth analysis than was possible in this study. Instead, the purpose 
was to build self-awareness among the leaders at NAVAIR of the dominant culture 
that exists within their organization. This was accomplished through the use of a 
culture assessment in order to determine the differences in the perception of the 
current and preferred organizational culture at both the individual department and 
Enterprise levels.  
NAVAIR 2.0 typifies an organization that may benefit from a cultural self-
assessment leading to a strategic plan to change the dominant culture. The primary 
reason is due to the continuous process improvement efforts that have been initiated 
within the organization. As stated by Cameron & Quinn (2006), modification of 
organizational culture is vital to the successful implementation of major improvement 
strategies (p. 16). Improvement efforts are dependent on culture change because 
when values, orientations, definitions, and goals remain the same, even when 
procedures and strategies are altered, organizations quickly return to the previous 
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The matching of leadership style with the organization’s dominant culture type 
is critical to the success of both the organization and the leader. Cameron & Quinn 
(2006) found that when an organization is dominated by a culture type, the most 
effective leaders are those who demonstrate a matching leadership style. 
Additionally, the highest performing leaders are also those who have developed the 
skills to operate effectively in any of the four quadrants or culture types (Denison, 
Hooijberg & Quinn, 1995). Consequently, this study has created an awareness of 
the dominant culture type within each of the five NAVAIR Contracting Directorate’s 
departments. Using Figure 13 and the results in Appendix F, the leaders of each 
department can alter or adjust their leadership style to coincide with the perceived 
current culture type. Furthermore, measuring the preferred culture helps leaders 
adjust their leadership style to conform to a new culture type, if change is warranted. 
For example, AIR 2.2 and Air 2.4 indicated a strong Hierarchy-dominant culture. 
Effective leaders in this culture type should seek to align their leadership skills with 
the organization by becoming proficient at coordinating, monitoring, organizing, and 
controlling efficiency. On the other hand, the study results revealed that AIR 2.3 and 
Air 2.6 had a predominantly Market-type culture. Effective “market type” leaders are 
those who tend to be hard-driving, competitive individuals who are good at 
motivating others and producing results. Finally, AIR 2.5 is the only department 
whose current and preferred culture is a Clan-type culture. While there is no one 
culture that will predict organizational success, Cameron & Quinn (2006), in their 
observation of more than 1,000 organizations, found that top managers tend to have 
higher Clan scores. Clan leaders are viewed as team builders, facilitators, and 
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Culture Type:  MARKET
Orientation:     Competing
Leader type:     Hard Driver
Competitor
Producer




Effectiveness:  Aggressively competing and
customer focus produce
effectiveness
Culture Type:  HIERARCHY
Orientation:     Controlling







Effectiveness:  Control and efficiency with
capable processes produce
effectiveness
Culture Type:  ADHOCRACY
Orientation:     Creative
Leader type:     Innovator
Entrepreneur
Visionary




Effectiveness:  Innovativeness, vision, and 
new resources produce
effectiveness
Culture Type:   CLAN
Orientation:      Collaborative





























Figure 13.   Competing Values of Leadership, Effectiveness,  
and Organizational Theory  
(After Cameron & Quinn, 2006) 
G. Summary 
This chapter discussed the administration of the CMMAT and OCAI surveys 
and provided a detailed description of the results. The CMMAT participant scores 
and results were reviewed in relation to each department and in aggregate for the 
Enterprise assessment. Additionally, a guide for contract management process 
improvement was provided for each of the five key process areas. The OCAI 
participant scores and results were also reviewed in relation to each department and 
in aggregate. The discussion of the OCAI results included a synopsis of how the 
organization’s leaders can better align their leadership style to organizational culture 
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answer the primary and secondary research questions, provide a statement of 
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V. Summary, Conclusions and Further Research 
A. Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of the research, including a review of the 
CMMM and OCAI assessment results, statements of conclusion to the primary and 
subsidiary questions posed in Chapter I, and a discussion of areas for further 
research.  
This study provides an external look at the Naval Air Systems Command 
Contracting Directorate contract management processes and organizational culture. 
It presented a review of the background of maturity models and organizational 
culture theory, discussed the framework of the Contract Management Maturity Model 
and Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument, evaluated the results of the 
assessments applied at the Naval Air Systems Command Contracting Directorate, 
and provided a guide to process improvement. 
The goal of this analysis was to contribute to a better understanding of 
contract management processes at NAVAIR 2.0 and to provide a greater awareness 
of organizational culture in order to assist the leadership to better align and develop 
leadership skills commensurate with the culture type revealed through this 
assessment. 
B. Summary 
This study assessed the maturity of the contracting processes and the 
organizational culture at the Naval Air Systems Command. The contracting 
processes were assessed using the Contract Management Maturity Model. The 
study surveyed 18 senior members of the Contracting Directorate to measure 
process capabilities in each of six key process areas. The study also surveyed 22 
members of the Contracting Directorate using the OCAI to measure organizational 
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The conclusions of this research are presented in the context of the research 
questions posed in Chapter I. This study assessed the following primary research 
question: 
 What level of maturity are the contracting processes at the 
NAVAIR Contracting Directorate? 
The maturity levels of contracting processes at the departmental level and 
Enterprise level are presented in Appendix E. The Enterprise key process areas of 
Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, Source Selection, and 
Contract Administration were assessed at the “structured” maturity level. At this level 
of maturity, contract management processes and standards are fully established, 
institutionalized, and mandated throughout the entire organization, but they are not 
necessarily integrated with other organizational core processes. The key process 
area of Contract Closeout was assessed to be at the “basic” maturity level. At this 
level of maturity, some basic contract management processes and standards have 
been established within the organization, but these processes are required only on 
selected complex, critical, or high-visibility contracts. The organization does not 
consider these contract management processes or standards established or 
institutionalized throughout the entire organization. 
The following supplementary research questions were answered: 
 How can the results of the study be used for process 
improvement at NAVAIR’s Contracting Directorate? 
As illustrated in Appendix E, the levels of maturity are not consistent across 
each department. The organization can leverage the best practices of those 
departments with higher assessed maturity levels and pass them on to the 
departments with lower assessed maturity levels. For example, AIR 2.2’s Contract 
Closeout processes were assessed to be “structured.” This was the highest maturity 
level in this key process area. Their best practices can be passed to the other four 
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Since every member of the organization should have a basic understanding 
of each phase of the contracting process, the organization can use the results of the 
assessment to revamp its training program. It can review weak key process areas 
and provide continuous training in these areas. Training should focus on the key 
activities within each key process area and best practices gained from both within 
and outside the organization. 
 What are the dominant culture types and strengths of NAVAIR‘s 
Contracting Directorate? 
The results of the OCAI are illustrated in Appendix F. AIR 2.2 and 2.4 indicate 
that they have a Hierarchy-type culture. The results indicate that AIR 2.3 and 2.6 
have a Market-type culture. AIR 2.5 was the only department assessed to have a 
Clan-type culture. The Contracting Directorate, as a whole, is assessed as having a 
balanced culture with a slight Hierarchy-type dominance. An assessment of the 
“preferred” culture type revealed that the Contracting Directorate prefers a mixed 
and balanced culture with a slight inclination for a Hierarchy-type culture. 
 Can the leaders at NAVAIR’s Contracting Directorate improve or 
maintain organizational performance by understanding its 
dominant culture type? 
The leaders at the NAVAIR Contracting Directorate should seek to 
understand their organizational culture for several reasons. First, a greater 
understanding of organizational culture allows them to align their leadership styles to 
the culture type for increased organizational performance. Second, a leader must 
lead organizational change for it to achieve lasting affects. A leader who 
understands the link between leadership and organizational culture will be better 
prepared to initiate major changes affecting the organization. An understanding of 
this link will, in turn, afford a better understanding of the cultural environment and 
foster lasting change—rather than short-lived change that ultimately returns to the 
previous culture. Finally, by establishing a firm grasp on the organization’s culture, a 
leader can more adeptly “roadmap” appropriate steps to successful accomplishment 
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C. Conclusion 
The preceding chapters and this chapter have explained the purpose of the 
study, developed the research questions, established the framework for conducting 
the study, discussed why the study is important, described the methodology for both 
assessments, explained the contracting process and why the NAVAIR was chosen, 
reported and interpreted results, drawn conclusions from the results, and, finally, 
discussed how this study might inform and assist future research. 
The results show that most of NAVAIR’s contracting departments are 
operating at the “integrated” or “structured” maturity level in all key process areas 
except Contract Closeout; in this area, they function predominantly at the “basic” 
level. There are no right or wrong culture types, and the cultural assessment did not 
indicate any significant cultural abnormalities. The leaders can use the culture 
assessment to refine their leadership skills for optimal organization performance. 
D. Areas for Further Research 
Several recommendations for additional research emerge from the present 
study. It is recommended that the NAVAIR Contracting Directorate conduct a follow-
on assessment in several years to determine trends and whether process maturation 
is occurring. This can be accomplished organically, through an outside consulting 
firm, or by another student at NPS.  
This study did not investigate the criteria of contracting process success. 
Further studies should investigate the interrelationship between contracting process 
maturity, organizational success, and organizational culture.  
Finally, additional research should be conducted at other Naval Systems 
Commands to enable best-practice sharing among all SYSCOMs. This would align 
with GAO recommendations to use best practices and enable synergistic benefits 
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Which Department/Program Executive Office (PEO) are you currently working with? 
 
PEO(A) PEO(T) PEO(W) PEO(JSF)        AIR 2.5 
 
How many years of contracting experience do you have?  
 




> 15 years 
 









CONTRACT MANAGEMENT MATURITY ASSESSMENT TOOL 
 
The Contract Management Maturity Assessment Tool consists of 10 statements 
for each of six contracting processes. Please read each statement carefully. For 
each statement, circle the number in the rating column that is most descriptive of 
your organization. If you are not sure, circle “DK” or “Don’t Know.” 
 
The ratings are: 
      
     1 = Never 
     2 = Seldom 
     3 = Sometimes 
     4 = Usually 
     5 = Always 
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CMMAT SURVEY SAMPLE QUESTIONS 7 
1.0 Procurement 
Planning 
Never Seldom Sometimes Usually Always Don’t 
Know 
The result of the acquisition 
planning process is a documented 
acquisition management plan that 
effectively provides a roadmap for 
the upcoming procurement. 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
The acquisition planning process 
is fully integrated with other 
organizational processes, such as 
cost management, engineering, 
and program management. 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
The acquisition planning process 
includes an integrated 
assessment of contract type 
selection, risk management, and 
contract terms and conditions. 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
 
2.0 Solicitation Planning Never Seldom Sometimes Usually Always Don’t 
Know 
The solicitation planning process 
uses standard procurement 
documents, such as formal 
requests for proposal, model 
contracts, and pre-approved terms 
and conditions, and some portions 
may be automated or paperless. 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
The team responsible for preparing 
the various solicitation documents 
includes representatives from other 
functional areas of the program, as 
well as the end-user. 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
The solicitation documents include 
appropriate evaluation criteria 
consistent with the acquisition 
strategy of the project. 





                                            
7 The questions in Appendix A are only a small sampling of the bank of survey questions available in 
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3.0 Solicitation Never Seldom Sometimes Usually Always Don’t 
Know 
The results of the solicitation 
process are accurate and complete 
bids or proposals from prospective 
offerors who have a clear common 
understanding of the technical and 
contractual requirements of the 
procurement. 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
The solicitation process includes 
using an established qualified 
bidders list, conducting market 
research, advertising, and holding 
bidders’ conferences. 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
The solicitation process includes 
soliciting inputs from industry to be 
used in developing solicitations for 
certain types of procurements. 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
 
4.0 Source Selection Never Seldom Sometimes Usually Always Don’t 
Know 
The organization uses evaluation 
criteria, evaluation standards, and 
a weighting system to evaluate 
proposals. 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
The organization uses the 
appropriate selection criteria, such 
as lowest cost/technically 
acceptable or best value, to meet 
the objectives of the acquisition 
strategy. 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
During the proposal evaluation 
process, the organization considers 
the offerors’ past performance, as 
well as technical, managerial, and 
financial capability. 




Never Seldom Sometimes Usually Always Don’t 
Know 
The organization has an 
established process for assigning 
contracts to individuals or teams for 
managing the post-award contract 
activities. 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
The organization conducts pre-
performance conferences with new 
contractors to discuss such issues 
as communication, contract change 
control, and performance-
monitoring procedures. 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
The organization has an 
established process for managing 
contract changes, contractor 
invoices and payments, and 
contract incentive and award fees. 
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6.0 Contract Closeout Never Seldom Sometimes Usually Always Don’t 
Know 
The organization has an 
established process for closing out 
contracts, ensuring completion of 
work, complete documentation, 
and resolution of financial and 
contract performance issues. 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
The contract closeout process 
requires verifying final delivery and 
payment, as well as obtaining the 
seller’s release of claims. 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
The organization adopts lessons 
learned and best practices as 
methods for continuously improving 
the contract closeout process. 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
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ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT 
 
The Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument consists of six sets of 
statements. Please read each statement carefully. For each statement, assign a 
number from 0 to 100 for how descriptive the statement is of your organization 
currently in the "now" column. Give a higher number of points to the statements 
that are most descriptive of your organization. Once you reach the total row, 
please be sure that your points total 100 for each set of statements. 
 
Once you have completed the ratings in the "now" column, please go back and 
reread the statements and think about how you anticipate your organization to 
change in the next five years in order to be highly successful. Please fill out these 
ratings in the "preferred" column. Please double check to see that your points 
total 100 for each set of statements. 
 
The table below provides an example for an organization that currently focuses 
on A, but is anticipating placing a higher emphasis on B in the future. 
Item Now Preferred 
A 65% 50% 
B 15% 35% 
C 15% 10% 
D 5% 5% 








1. Dominant Characteristics 
Now Preferred 
A   The organization is a very personal place. It is like an extended family. 
People seem to share a lot of themselves. 
  
B   The organization is a very dynamic and entrepreneurial place. People 
are willing to stick their necks out and take risks. 
  
C   The organization is very results-oriented. A major concern is with 
getting the job done. People are very competitive and achievement-
oriented. 
  
D   The organization is a very controlled and structured place. Formal 
procedures generally govern what people do. 
  
TOTAL 100 100 
   
2. Organizational Leadership Now Preferred 
A   The leadership in the organization is generally considered to exemplify 
mentoring, facilitating, or nurturing. 
  
B   The leadership in the organization is generally considered to exemplify 
entrepreneurship, innovation, or risk taking. 
  
C   The leadership in the organization is generally considered to exemplify 
a no-nonsense, aggressive, results-oriented focus. 
  
D   The leadership in the organization is generally considered to exemplify 
coordinating, organizing, or smooth-running efficiency. 
  
TOTAL 100 100 
   
3. Management of Employees Now Preferred 
A   The management style in the organization is characterized by 
teamwork, consensus, and participation. 
  
B   The management style in the organization is characterized by individual 
risk taking, innovation, freedom, and uniqueness.  
  
C   The management style in the organization is characterized by hard-
driving competitiveness, high remands, and achievement.  
  
D   The management style in the organization is characterized by security 
of employment, conformity, predictability, and stability in relationships.  
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4. Organization Glue Now Preferred 
A   The glue that holds the organization together is loyalty and mutual trust. 
Commitment to this organization runs high. 
  
B   The glue that holds the organization together is commitment to 
innovation and development. There is an emphasis on being on the cutting 
edge. 
  
C   The glue that holds the organization together is the emphasis on 
achievement and goal accomplishment. 
  
D   The glue that holds the organization together is formal rules and 
policies. Maintaining a smooth-running organization is important. 
  
TOTAL 100 100 
   
5. Strategic Emphases Now Preferred 
A   The organization emphasizes human development. High trust, 
openness, and participation persist. 
  
B   The organization emphasizes acquiring new resources and creating 
new challenges. Trying new things and prospecting for opportunities are 
valued. 
  
C   The organization emphasizes competitive actions and achievement. 
Hitting stretch targets and winning in the marketplace are dominant. 
  
D   The organization emphasizes permanence and stability. Efficiency, 
control, and smooth operations are important. 
  
TOTAL 100 100 
   
6. Criteria of Success Now Preferred 
A   The organization defines success on the basis of the development of 
human resources, teamwork, employee commitment, and concern for 
people. 
  
B   The organization defines success on the basis of having the most 
unique or  newest products. It is a product leader and innovator. 
  
C   The organization defines success on the basis of winning in the 
marketplace and outpacing the competition. Competitive market leadership 
is key. 
  
D   The organization defines success on the basis of efficiency. 
Dependable delivery, smooth scheduling, and low-cost production are 
critical. 
  
TOTAL 100 100 
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Appendix D. AIR 2.0 Organizational Chart 
AIR 2.0 ORGANIZATION 
2.0
Assistant Commander for Contracts
2.0A/B




















































2.2.2 E-2/C-2, E-2D, F-14
2.2.3 F/A-18
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Appendix E. NAVAIR Contracting Directorate 
Maturity Levels 
1
AD HOC               
2
BASIC               
3
STRUCTURED               
4
INTEGRATED               
5











CONTRACT MANAGEMENT KEY PROCESS AREASMATURITY
LEVELS























:  AIR 2.2 / PEO(T) 
:  AIR 2.3 / PEO(A) 
:  AIR 2.4 / PEO(W) 
:  AIR 2.5 / AIRCRAFT SUPPORT CONTRACTS 
:  AIR 2.6 / PEO(JSF) 
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Appendix F. OCAI Results 
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